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Abstract
This thesis studies opposition party behavior in competitive authoritarian regimes
using the Singapore 2011 general election as a case study. The study asks, what is
the primary reason Worker’s Party, the strongest opposition party in Singapore,
did not pursue the formation of a pre-electoral coalition? I analyzed the preexisting theories and conducted fieldwork, interviewing opposition party leaders,
academics and activists, to ascertain a direct impediment and not just a
background condition to coalition building. Many of the pre-existing theories
contained insights relevant in Singapore, but the operationalization of the variable
limited their significance. I demonstrate that Worker’s Party did not pursue
building a coalition, firstly, because they perceived the other potential partner as
possessing less credibility with the electorate, and was thus unable to provide
unique value to the partnership. Secondly, because when the three leading all
opposition parties are weak, and do not possess a level of credibility in the eyes of
the electorate, then they are less likely to coalesce. As a result, Worker’s Party
does not trust the effectiveness and longevity of a coalition.
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Executive Summary
This study analyzes opposition party behavior in competitive authoritarian
regimes using the 2011 Singapore general election as a case study. Prevailing
wisdom assumes that opposition parties that share a common enemy, in the case
of Singapore it’s the authoritarian government – the People’s Action Party (PAP),
would work closely together to accomplish a shared goal of unseating the
incumbent. This paper asks, what is the primary reason the Worker’s Party, the
most credible opposition party, did not pursue a pre-electoral coalition with other
opposition parties? I aimed to determine a direct impediment to coalition building.
This assumed that there is a “potential cost” for coalescing with the wrong partner
and that a potential partner must provide unique value to the partnership.
Singapore remains an appropriate case study due to its small size and
underdeveloped opposition. To truly attribute a casual factor to the absence of a
pre-electoral coalition, an agreement among of shared parliamentary support
between leading opposition party and the second and/or third largest party, I
needed to understand the motivations, the strategies, and the perspective of the
different opposition parties and their leaders. Singapore’s size made it
manageable to interview a variety of opposition party members, civic activists and
academics in a two-week time frame. Since the opposition party system is
underdeveloped, those I interviewed either knew each other or were separated by
very few “degrees”.
The PAP has ruled Singapore since its founding in 1963. The government
disregards freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of the press.
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Nevertheless, the government ushered in historic economic success and
modernization over the last six decades. In the 2011 general election, the PAP
won the smallest share of the popular vote (60.1%) since 1961. The Worker’s
Party garnered six seats in the government, including a group representation
constituency (GRC), a fate assumed unfeasible by the electorate. Even with the
PAP’s moderate success in the popular vote they still took 81/87 of the votes due
to gerrymandering and electoral manipulations. Nevertheless, academics and
opposition party leaders view this election as a watershed event.
Due to the levels of liberalization and contestation during the 2011 general
election, Singapore is considered by academics as a competitive authoritarian
regime. In this government typology, the incumbent manipulates the democratic
system to produce an “uneven playing field.” However, there is enough
competition that elections remain a political even that legitimizes the governance
of the ruling regime.
In the 2011 election, Singapore opposition parties coordinated in which
electoral wards each opposition party would compete in. This is a win-win
situation since opposition parties do not have enough viable candidates to
compete in more than 30% of the wards. Furthermore, in a 2013 by-election, the
Singapore Democratic Party, the most civic activist party, requested to coalesce
with Worker’s Party the leading opposition party. Worker’s party did not even
answer the coalition offer. In Singapore, while opposition parties recognize a
shared enemy, they are more fragmented than united.
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I analyzed the pre-existing theories in the literature using the information
gained from the interviews, to determine the primary reason Worker’s Party did
not pursue a pre-electoral coalition. The pre-existing theories in the literature were
analyzed by asking three questions: (1) Is the explanation valid with Singapore’s
electoral dynamics? (2) Is the explanation relevant to the realities of Singaporean
society? and (3) Does the explanation identify a direct impediment to a preelectoral coalition? The pre-existing factors reveal insights applicable in
Singapore, such as a power imbalance between two opposition parties can impede
coalition building, but their operationalization is limiting and is mostly
inapplicable to Singapore.
H1: I hypothesize that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases
when one potential partner perceives the other as possessing less credibility with
the electorate, and thus is unable to provide unique value to the partnership and
H2: If the largest three opposition parties are weak and do not possess a level of
credibility in the eyes of the electorate, then they are less likely to coalesce. The
underlying insights of H1 are, first, that a leading opposition party can lose
credibility by coalescing with the wrong partner – a direct impediment to preelectoral coalition formation. Second, the leading party needs to significantly
benefit from a pre-electoral coalition. If not, it would prefer to compete alone to
avoid sharing the spoils of electoral success. The underlying assumption for H2 is
that because opposition parties tend to be fragile and volatile in competitive
authoritarian regimes, weaker opposition parties in these regimes will not trust the
longevity of the coalition. The parties will presume that they will be able to

6
compete against other opposition parties in the long run; however, there is no
concrete threshold for this measurement.
In competitive authoritarian regimes, like Singapore, the incumbent
government manipulates the electoral system to hinder opposition parties from
gaining power. Oppressive acts in the country’s history frighten strong candidates
away from joining opposition parties. Activists with programmatic aspirations
not aligned with the median voter are the ones who typically build the party
(Greene, 2006). Basic freedoms in a democracy, such as freedom of speech and
assembly, may be controlled by the incumbent’s bureaucratic system, hindering
the ability of opposition parties to campaign. The past legacies of incompetent
opposition parties, often based on a leader’s self-interest, reduce the political
commitment of the electorate. Because of factors like these, opposition parties
find it difficult to gain credibility.
Interviewees from Worker’s Party provide the evidence that credibility is
the primary impediment to pre-electoral coalition formation. Gerald Giam, WP
parliamentary candidate, said, “There needs to be a coalition of equals to
coordinate” (personal communication, December 16, 2013). Furthermore, other
experts, such as Professor Bliver Singh, corroborate his remark. He says, that if
WP joined a coalition “it [would be] a liability and not an asset” (personal
communication, December 17, 2013). Furthermore, when asking those in the
Worker’s Party their aim for the next election and future aspirations they
emphasize developing their credibility with the electorate. WP parliamentary
candidate Yee said, “It’s clear [that we must] build up party brand. We are not
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ready to take over right now. We need to offer [the electorate] a party brand they
can trust [with] credible candidates” (personal communication, December 18,
2013).
The second hypothesis is also demonstrated through the interviews. Giam
and Yee indicate that they view Worker’s Party as weak and that unseating the
PAP is a long-term goal. Thus, there is less incentive to coalesce. Giam says, “In
the long term [we wish to] be the ruling party. But we shouldn’t have too lofty
goals [in the next election] … it is wishful thinking” (personal communication,
December 16, 2014). The credibility theory has considerable conceptual overlap
with the pre-existing theories. Nevertheless, the credibility theory provides an
abstract framework to better understand opposition party behavior and revealing a
direct impediment to coalition building.
A pre-electoral coalition theory has gained prominence in the academic
literature due its debated effect on spurring democratization, liberalization and
electoral turnover. This analysis builds on the aforementioned literature, but is
also the first effort to explain the absence of pre-electoral coalitions in
competitive authoritarian regimes.

8

Acknowledgements
This project would not have been accomplished without the guidance and
patience of my advisor Professor Hanson. I am indebted to Prof. Hanson’s
willingness to disentangle my thoughts and help organize them. Thank you to
Avi, Everett, Emily, Max, and Evan for being my “soundboards” for my ideas. I
am still surprised you remained my friends once my ability to talk about anything
else became nonexistent. I am eternally grateful for my family friends the
Alexander’s for hosting me in Singapore. Their hospitality is only matched by
their ability to spread fun and laughter. The Marcus-Crowne was essential for my
project. Thank you to the Honor’s Department for selecting me and the families
for their donations. To my family – I am sorry I went “missing in action” during
this process. I always appreciate your support and understanding.
Lastly, thank you to the interviewees. Your kindness was incredible and
surprising. Your candor and insights are the true backbone of this paper.

9

Chapter 1
Introduction
I. Introduction:
Before the 21st century, scholars perceived regimes through the paradigm
of a democratic spectrum: regimes are either democracies or are transitioning
from authoritarianism to a more democratic form. Levitsky and Way refer to this
tendency as a democratizing bias (Levitsky & Way, 2002). In the 1990’s, some
authoritarian governments transitioned to democracies (Taiwan), others became
more authoritative (Belarus), and yet others remained stable (Malaysia). This led
to new terminology differentiating authoritarian regimes based on levels of
liberalization and competition.
In their seminal article, Levitsky and Way (2002) introduced the term
“competitive authoritarian regime” to define multi-party authoritarian regimes in
which elections tend to be free from massive fraud, but the electoral playing field
is swayed in the incumbents’ favor. In these regimes, incumbents manipulate
democratic norms indirectly through such means as an abusive tax authority, a
compliant judiciary, control of the media and gerrymandering. These elections
however, remain a point of contestation between the incumbent and opposition
parties, and thus are a factor in the legitimacy of the governing party. In
competitive authoritarian regimes, incumbents manipulate the system more
intensely than in authoritarian systems, such as hegemonic authoritarian regimes,
even though elections are fairer and more competitive (Dunno, 2013).
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Since the reversal of the democratizing bias, scholars have studied
whether specific structural and strategic conditions increase the likelihood of
electoral turnover, short-term liberalization and long-term democratization.
Prevailing wisdom assumes that coalition building is one of the available
strategies a group of opposition parties may employ to pressure a hegemonic
power to democratize. As Roesller and Howard (2006) point out, first, an
opposition coalition may take votes away from the margin between the incumbent
and the coalesced challenger. Secondly, coalition building also reduces the
incumbent’s ability to co-opt and divide opposition parties through patronage
distribution or other measures. Third, it may signal to the electorate that the
opposition is organized and credible. Fourth, police officers and other public
servants may be less incline to employ and condone electoral repression. Finally,
it mobilizes the electorate to vote for the opposition as they realize the prospect of
an electoral change is more likely. However, a scholarly consensus on whether
opposition coalition building increases the likelihood of political change remains
debated.
Howard and Roessler (2006) build on Larry Diamond’s observation that
opposition victory in a competitive authoritarian regime requires a level of
opposition mobilization, unity and skill, and heroism far beyond what would
normally be required for victory in a democracy (Diamond, 2002, p. 28). They
demonstrate that the formation of opposition coalitions directly correlates to a
liberalizing moment after the elections. In another vein, in an analysis of postcommunist Russia, Bunce and Wolchik (2010) determined that a comprehensive
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electoral strategy,1 including an opposition coalition, induced electoral turnover.
Michael Wahman (2013) however, determined that opposition coalition building
might affect the likelihood of opposition victory, but it does not induce not longterm democratization, as the new winners often maintain the old system.
Understanding pre-electoral coalition formation matters because of its potentially
direct effect on stimulating political change in authoritarian regimes.
Research on the conditions that spur political transformation in
authoritarian regimes has drawn academic attention to the factors that induce preelectoral coalitions. Some scholars, such as Wahman (2011) and Ghandi and
Reuter (2013), have constructed and tested theories on the pre-conditions and
incentives for pre-electoral coalition building. However, their focus is primarily
on factors affecting the formation of coalition building. Scholars have given little
attention to the converse – what deters coalition building. The deterrence of
coalition building is a puzzle because a logical assumption is that opposition
parties in authoritarian regimes share a common enemy, the incumbent, and thus,
would be incentivized to coalesce. Yet, pre-electoral coalitions in such regimes
are rare.
Studying the impediments to pre-electoral coalitions reveals attributes a
potential cost to merging with the wrong partner, a conception not focused on in
the literature. This research study will complement the general literature on the
durability of authoritarian regimes and the methods employed by the incumbent to
1

This electoral strategy included a unified opposition supporting one candidate
linked with a mobilized civic society, to energize citizens to vote, pressure and
monitor the government to not manipulate the elections and provide public
opinion information to help the electorate frame their ideas
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tip the “electoral playing field.” Yet it also assigns agency not only to the
incumbent government, on which most scholars focus, but also to the interplay
among the opposition party elites for choosing their electoral strategy. As the
frequency of single-party elections has decreased since the 1980’s (Ghandi and
Reuter, 2013, 139), understanding the dynamics of opposition parties in
authoritarian regimes in multi-party elections is worth pursuing.
Due to the level of contestation in the 2011 General Election, Stephan
Ortmann (2011) asserts that Singapore has transformed into a competitive
authoritarian regime from a hegemonic authoritarian regime. Since Singapore’s
founding, the People’s Action Party (PAP), the incumbent government, disregards
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the media. However,
numerous Singaporean politicians and academics considered the 2011
parliamentary election a watershed event: The PAP won the smallest share of the
popular vote (60.1%) since 1960 (Ortmann, 2011), an election before the citystate’s independence.2 Moreover, The WP, the most credible opposition party,
for the first time won a group representation constituency (GRC) (Ortmann,
2011), a feat assumed unfeasible for opposition parties (K.M. Siew, personal
communication, December 17, 2013). Thus, the Singaporean 2011 general
election provides a case for unraveling some of the puzzles regarding opposition
party behavior in competitive authoritarian regimes.
This paper will ask the following central question:

2

Due to district manipulations, this resulted in the opposition only gaining six out
of 87 parliament seats
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1. What is the primary reason opposition parties in Singapore did not
form a pre-electoral coalition for the 2011 parliamentary election?
I answered the aforementioned questions by analyzing the explanations
provided in the literature and conducting fieldwork from December 13-30 in
Singapore. Using insights from both fieldwork and the literature enabled my
argument to attribute a direct impediment deterring the formation of pre-electoral
coalition in Singapore. For this thesis, I interviewed six officials from four
different political parties, three civic activists, an academic, a blog editor and a
blog writer. Included in this group was a self-identified government “mole.” 3
Information from these interviews was not merely considered as face-value truths,
but was problematized and contextualized in the framework of Singaporean
politics and opposition party dynamics. The explanations from the literature
provided the framework for analyzing the background conditions and direct
impediments to pre-electoral coalition formation.
Singapore is an enlightening case for studying opposition party behavior
in authoritarian regimes because of the practicality of conducting research. I was
able to glean the necessary information from fieldwork in a short two-week time
frame because of the size of the country and the populace’s limited opposition
party involvement. Many of those interviewed knew each other on a personal
level or were separated by very few degrees. With the reversal of the
3

The mole wrote articles criticizing the government in opposition blogs. He told
me that people in the government sent him analyses to publish, in order to create
problems for the PAP to solve and to show how incompetent the opposition
parties were. He received government perks like his own radio show and acted as
a messenger of the successes of the PAP - ushered state capitalism for facilitating
economic growth.
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democratizing bias and the successes of non-democratic forms of government at
spurring modernization, such as China and the Gulf countries, the electorate may
evaluate the government based on how effectively they responds to their needs
and not just on whether they are a democracy. As these countries modernize,
alternative voices in society are going to clamor for liberalization. Using
Singapore as a case provides insight regarding opposition party behavior in
modernized countries that are not yet competitive authoritarian regimes, but in the
future may undergo similar dynamics. Lastly, according to modernization theory
(Przeworski and Limongi, 1996), Singapore should be liberalized, since it has a
post-industrialist regime the country. Analyzing opposition party behavior, a
potential indicator for future democratization, may provide answers for why
Singapore has not democratized and when it might
The second chapter of the paper is a literature review of all of the theories
affecting pre-electoral coalition formation. The analysis of these theories points
out their limitations and establishes the foundation for my argument. The third
chapter aims to analyze how applicable the explanations from the literature are. I
aim to disentangle the strengths and weaknesses of the theories to explain the
absence of pre-electoral coalitions in Singapore and other competitive
authoritarian regimes by asking: (1) Is the explanation valid with Singapore’s
electoral dynamics? (2) Is the explanation relevant to the realities of Singaporean
society? and (3) Does the explanation identify a direct impediment to a preelectoral coalition? The chapter also provides background information on the
history of Singapore and, more specifically, the 2011 general election. The fourth
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chapter uses the interviews to test two hypotheses: H1: The likelihood of a preelectoral coalition decreases when one potential partner perceives the other as
possessing less credibility with the electorate, and thus is unable to provide
unique value to the partnership and H2: If the largest three opposition parties are
weak and do not possess a level of credibility in the eyes of the electorate, then
they are less likely to coalesce. Lastly, the fifth chapter discusses the
explanation’s applicability to other competitive authoritarian regimes and points
out avenues for possible further research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
In this section, I have selected and evaluated five explanations from the
academic literature that analyzes coalition building in authoritarian regimes: (1)
electoral prospects, (2) policy compatibility, (3) external pressure from civic
society and/or the international community, (4) the age of the opposition party,
and (5) party asymmetry. The limitations of these factors for explaining the
primary impediment to coalition building help support my proposal of an
alternative factor: credibility. Many insights in the pre-existing theories overlap
with credibility; however, I argue that credibility is a better explanation for
understanding the absence of pre-electoral coalitions in Singapore. The
Credibility Hypotheses state that H1: The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition
decreases when one potential partner perceives the other as possessing less
credibility with the electorate, and is thus unable to provide unique value to the
partnership, and H2: If the largest three leading opposition parties are weak and
do not possess a level of credibility in the eyes of the electorate, then they are less
likely to coalesce.
The first section of this chapter will discuss two different types of
coalitions and their implications, and will explain the different ramifications of
coalition building in competitive authoritarian regimes versus hegemonic
authoritarian regimes. The former will specify the type of coalition, a preelectoral coalition, analyzed in this paper. The latter will describe the implications
of coalitions in different authoritarian contexts to illuminate the intrinsic
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limitations of using data from only competitive authoritarian regimes to test
explanations for pre-electoral coalition formation.
The second section examines the five aforementioned explanations and
their limitations in justifying pre-electoral coalitions. The analysis of each of the
explanations describes whether the explanation is a background condition – a
factor that correlates with the absence of a pre-electoral coalition – or a direct
impediment – a factor that is the reason for the absence of a pre-electoral
coalition. All of the factors except party asymmetry provide reasons for preelectoral coalition formation; this section assesses the effects of the converse, the
absence of pre-electoral coalitions among opposition parties. Furthermore, the
operationalization of the explanations, especially for electoral prospects and age
of the largest party, is heavily scrutinized. The third section outlines the
Credibility Hypothesis – a premise that is an impediment to a pre-electoral
coalition formation.

Section 2.1: Considerations for Coalition Building
I. Marginal Coalitions vs. Pre-Electoral Coalitions
Fortunately for our understanding of coalition building, the academic research
distinguishes among different types of coalitions, based on the underlying goals of
the opposition parties. Wahman (2011) explicitly points out that the objectives for
coalition building by weaker parties, with no realistic prospect of ruling, differ
from those of stronger opposition parties, who can viably contend for power. He
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refers to the former as marginal coalitions and to the latter as coalitions of
contestation or pre-electoral coalitions.
Marginal coalitions, agreements among weaker parties before an election
to support a joint party list or executive, aim to win parliamentary seats or
pressure the government on a policy issue. Weaker ethnic or ideological parties
may join together to promote a specific niche interest (Wahman, 2011, 643).
Smaller parties may also coalesce to increase their public profile with the
electorate or to represent specific societal cleavages in the electorate.
Wahman defines the second type, a pre-electoral coalition, is an
agreement before the elections, between the largest oppositional party and the
second and/or third oppositional party to combine parliamentary lists or
supporting the same list (2011). For the Presidential system, the largest opposition
party and the next two largest opposition parties would share a candidate. The key
difference “is [that] the first opposition party has declared the will to govern
together with at least one of the parties prior to the election” (Wahman, 2011,
643). Since the purposes of the two coalitions are different, the explanations for
what spurs or deters pre-electoral coalitions and marginal coalitions are different.
The classification of coalitions in the authoritarian context is more
important for examining opposition party dynamics than in the democratic context
because there is “greater reward” and “greater consequence” when pre-electoral
coalitions are formed. A pact by the leading party, and by either, or both, the
second or/and third largest party, if successful, could be a rare moment that spurs
electoral turnover. However, the risk is that it may prompt oppressive measures
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from the incumbent; the incumbent may perceive the coalition as legitimate
competitors and harass them before the election. In democracies, electoral
turnover is a prerequisite, and opposition parties are protected from incumbent
abuse.
II: The Impact of Pre-Electoral Coalitions on Competitive Authoritarian
Regimes and Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes
The two biggest differences between competitive authoritarian regimes
and hegemonic authoritarian regimes are the level of contestation and the level of
fraud in the elections. Studies suggest that factors for the formation or absence of
pre-electoral coalitions under these regime types are different. This assumption is
derived from a study that demonstrated that when there is an opposition coalition
regimes (Dunno, 2013), competitive authoritarian regimes have a greater
likelihood of electoral democratization in elections than hegemonic authoritarian
regimes.4 In competitive authoritarian regimes, these coalitions increased the
likelihood of democratization by 60% (Dunno, 2013, 771). Conversely, they were
found to have a negative effect in hegemonic authoritarian regimes (Dunno, 2013,
771). The rationale behind this assumption is that, since the frequency of positive
outcomes from pre-electoral coalitions are varied, the background conditions and
direct explanations for this phenomenon must also be varied.

Section 2.2: Evaluation of Pre-Electoral Coalition Literature

4

The study also demonstrates that international conditionality, in which the
international community applies concrete punishments and rewards corresponding
to the quality of the election, also explains the different levels of democratization
between the regime types.
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I. Electoral Prospects
The theory of electoral prospects is a prominent theory in pre-electoral
coalition formation. This explanation hypothesizes that as the prospects for
electoral success increase, the more likely opposition parties will form a preelectoral coalition. This argument is built on van de Walle’s theoretical
construction of the “tipping game.” In this process, van de Walle asserts that
opposition parties would only coalesce if there were a realistic chance of a victory
(Wahman, 2011, 705). His assumption is that a pre-electoral coalition will
increase the chances of winning, thus incentivizing the parties to coalesce. This
follows the logic that an opposition party, if able, would rather defeat the
incumbent alone and avoid sharing power in the case of a victory. The theory
notes that there are “potential costs” for forming a pre-electoral coalition. One of
these costs is that a coalition reduces the possibility of receiving patronage, a
tactic often used to co-opt and divide opposition parties: a coalition would signal
to the incumbents the presence of a legitimate challenger, thereby prompting the
wrath of the regime (Wahman, 2011, 645).
However, the major limitation is that the theory fails to encompass an
electoral situation in which electoral prospects are high for only one party. In this
circumstance, the leading party is not incentivized to form a pre-electoral
coalition. Thus, the theory fails to illuminate that an opposition party seeks a
benefit from a pre-electoral coalition. If an opposition party is electorally viable
by themselves, and a potential partner does not add value to the coalition, a preelectoral coalition is less likely to occur. A second limitation is that the concept of
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electoral prospects is difficult to measure in society. The value in the theory is
that it illuminates a background condition that inhibits/spurs pre-electoral
coalitions; the drawback of the theory is that it does not provide a direct
explanation for pre-electoral coalition formation.
Wahman’s research made a significant contribution to van de Walle’s
tipping game theory and pre-electoral coalition theory in general (Wahman,
2011). First, he recognized some of the deficiencies of electoral prospects for
explaining pre-electoral coalitions and postulated the impact of policy
compatibility on pre-electoral formation. Second, he made a valid attempt to
operationalize the concept of electoral prospects and demonstrated the factor’s
impact on pre-electoral coalitions
Wahman (2011) operationalized electoral prospects using independent
variables such as economic performance and liberalization, which studies have
demonstrated correlate with authoritarian regime durability and electoral turnover.
Poor economic performance has been shown to harm the chances of incumbent
re-election (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009). Voters often vote based on their
economic situations. Wahman’s analysis indicates that the likelihood of a preelectoral coalition increases when a regime’s economic performance is poor.
Are pre-electoral coalitions less likely to form if a regime’s economic
performance is high? In the western context, economic voting is a primary
explanation for incumbent success (Wahman, 2011, 646). As bread and butter
issues usually are prioritized, it would seem that economic progress impedes the
opposition from gaining support. This inability to gain support in the authoritarian
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context increases the fragility and volatility of opposition parties, especially the
smaller ones, and reduces their ability to attract viable candidates. Moreover, an
environment that is not conducive to building an opposition party, such as strong
economic performance, prevents opposition parties from developing value.
The second operationalized theory of electoral prospects maintains that a
period of liberalization, when political rights/ civil rights are improved, may make
the opposition more optimistic about their electoral prospects. The notion that a
regime is reducing its electoral manipulations may compel opposition parties to
believe that the incumbent will more likely respect democratic law (Wahman,
2011, 646). Wahman (2011) found that opposition parties are more likely to form
pre-electoral coalitions if the election was preceded by a period of liberalization.
Besides being a signal of electoral prospects, as Wahman intends the variable to
represent, a period of liberalization provides a space for opposition parties to
campaign for the electorate. Opposition parties are able to publicize their message
to the masses, and possible liberalization of the media would provide more even
coverage. As more opposition parties are able to gain strength, there is a more
likely chance of a pre-electoral coalition. While Wahman demonstrates the
significance of electoral prospects for pre-electoral coalition, other academics still
question whether it is a casual factor for democratization (Bunce and Wolchik,
2006, 74).
II. Policy Compatibility
The policy positions of opposition parties in relation to each other and to
the incumbent government are another consideration in pre-electoral coalition
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theory. In democracies, policy compatibility directly impacts opposition
coalitions. If a party coalesces with a party diametrically opposed to them, then
their support from the electorate will be reduced (Golder, 2005). Wahman
statistically demonstrated that in competitive authoritarian regimes “opposition
parties are more likely to coalesce if they a) have a policy position that is more
distinct from the incumbent government, provided they are b) ideologically on the
same side of the ideological spectrum when compared to the ruling regime,
referred as “unipolar.”5 If the authoritarian regime is unipolar, the greater are the
policy differences between opposition parties and the incumbent, and the more
likely it is that the electorate will support opposition parties. An electorate is less
likely to punish ideologically close opposition parties that coalesce.
The ideological stances of two opposition parties are salient in explaining
the absence of pre-electoral coalitions. A leading opposition party is less likely to
coalesce with an ideologically dissimilar party because they fear alienating their
supporters. Furthermore, opposition parties will fear losing ideological members,
typically the party-builders in party (Greene, 2006), by joining a coalition of
convenience. A pre-electoral coalition between/among ideologically disparate
opposition parties, in which the parties stand on opposite sides of the government
on an important issue, is an active impediment to a coalition.
The limitations of this theory for explaining the formation and absence of
pre-electoral coalitions can be seen in countries where the electorate does not vote
based on policies. This is exemplified in the Malaysian electoral system, in which
5

Example of unipolar using abortion: the incumbent is anti-abortion and the
opposition parties are pro-choice
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two out of the three opposition parties in the 2013 parliamentary election, were
ethnic/religious parties. The former represents the interests of the majority Malay
community; whereas, the later represents the Chinese minority.
In competitive authoritarian regimes, the incumbent obstructs party
building by manipulating the democratic system. This creates an opposition party
system that is weak, unstable and volatile: Gandhi and Reuter found that the
average number of effective opposition parties in the authoritarian context in the
post-war era was 5.6, while in democracies it was only 3.45% (2013, 138).
Opposition parties often have limited programmatic appeal and are institutionally
weak. Many parties are personality-based and are not able to build institutional
strength and continuity because of the ruling regime. These general characteristics
of opposition parties restrict this theory from primarily explaining the
formation/absence of coalition building.
The theory of policy compatibility alludes to other orientations that
explain the occurrence of pre-electoral coalitions. For example, the strategic
orientation among opposition parties affects pre-electoral coalition formation. The
degree to which an opposition party incriminates the ruling regime, as well as the
manner in which they demand change, impacts the likelihood of pre-electoral
coalitions. The closer are two parties’ strategies for advocating change, the more
likely a pre-electoral coalition will be formed. Extreme strategic differences
between coalition partners compel voters to punish the parties for associating with
each other.
III. Pressure from Civic Society and/or the International Community

25
In many authoritarian regimes, opposition parties are too disparate to form
a pre-electoral coalition. Bunce and Wolchik learned from opposition leaders in
post-communist regimes that “pressures on opposition [parties] from civil society
organizations and from the donor community played an extremely important role
in determining whether they would decide to cooperate and whether they would
continue collaboration for the duration of the electoral campaign” (2006, 74). The
theory is that a “push” by external forces, either civic society and/or the
international community, allowed opposition parties to overcome the prospect of
having to share the spoils from a potential electoral victory, in order to form a preelectoral coalition (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006).
Bunce and Wolchik studied 11 elections in competitive authoritarian
regimes in the post-communist former Soviet Union to determine the factors that
induced regime turnover. In all elections, there was some level of opposition unity
and varying levels of external pressure. Furthermore, the strategies in some
countries were transmitted to others, an element unique in these elections.
International pressure may directly incentivize the formation of pre-electoral
coalitions in select situations, but the absence of international pressure cannot be
considered a direct impediment to pre-electoral coalitions. A direct impediment
for pre-electoral coalition assumes a “potential cost” impeding the two parties
from working together. Moreover, the absence of international pressure does not
explain how one party would lose support from another if they coalesce.
Pressure from civic society for opposition parties to work together is a
more common factor in pre-electoral formation, but the lack of such pressure is
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not an impediment to pre-electoral coalitions. Perhaps it alludes to correlating
explanations, such as that the lack of pressure may signal an underdeveloped civil
society, which would provide the space for opposition party members to engage
potential candidates and potential supporters. However, the absence of pressure
from civil society fails to qualify as the direct impediment for the formation of an
opposition party coalition.
IV. Age of the Largest Opposition Party
Gandhi and Reuter determined that the age of the largest opposition party
dramatically affects the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition in authoritarian
regimes. In 9% of legislative elections in which the largest opposition party had
never before run in an election, there was a pre-electoral coalition (Gandhi and
Reuter, 2013, 140). This number increased to 25% when the largest opposition
party competed in seven or more elections (Gandhi and Reuter, 2013, 140). The
authors conclude that this variable implies “that there is at least one significant
party that has had the opportunity to build a reputation for cooperative behavior,
and hence a coalition is more likely” (Gandhi and Reuter, 2013, 140). I argue that
this assumption, that the older an opposition party is, the more likely it is to have
a reputation for cooperative behavior is misleading. Evidence is lacking that older
opposition parties are more willing to collaborate with others. Perhaps they have a
history of challenging the incumbent alone. Moreover, if they have coalesced in
the past, then they may believe coalitions are effective.
I assert that this variable indicates that the older the largest opposition
party is, the more likely it is to project stability and thus, the more likely it is to be

27
a viable partner for coalescing. Since most opposition parties are weak, an
opposition party system with a strong, stable party increases the likelihood of
coalitions. If one party is strong, then there is a greater possibility that two parties
possess independent value. Commenting on opposition parties in post-communist
competitive authoritarian regimes, Bunce and Wolchik write:
Opposition parties in the post-communist world--as a result of the absence
of a democratic past in most cases, the deeply penetrative character of the
communist experiment and its classless legacies, and the costs of partial
economic reforms-tend to be very new, fluid formations that are
independent of social cleavages and are dominated by leaders who have
little understanding of bargaining and compromise. ... As a result,
opposition politics in the competitive authoritarian regimes in this region
in particular tends to be long on “posturing” and short on policy, and
opposition parties are often “self-destructive, because their “leaders are
much more interested in keeping people out, rather than brining people in.
(60)
The aforementioned characterization is indicative of opposition parties in other
competitive authoritarian regimes. The age of the party implies that a party brand
is stable and evokes the possibility that another party may provide electoral value
and thus incentivizes the leading party to form a pre-electoral coalition.
V. Party Asymmetry
Reuter and Gandhi statistically determined that party asymmetry, the ratio
of votes or seats between the first and second largest opposition parties in the
previous election, has an impact on pre-electoral coalition formation. The
rationale behind is that the greater the party asymmetry, the less likely a party
would be incentivized to compete with a weaker party, who may not provide
additional value (2013, 143). The larger party would perceive running alone as a
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viable electoral strategy and presume they could defeat the other directly in future
elections.
In certain electoral circumstances, party asymmetry increases the absence
of pre-electoral coalitions. This explanation alludes to the notion that there are
risks and costs for pre-electoral coalition formation. First, it may signal to the
incumbents a legitimate threat and increase electoral manipulations and repression
against the leading party. Moreover, opposition parties tend to be weak and not
have a strong party brand. A stronger party may dilute the party brand if it
coalesces with a weaker party. Nevertheless, the operationalization of the variable
limits for measuring degree of party value is limited. For example, in a society
where ethnic identities are politically mobilized, a weaker opposition party may
add value to a leading party representing a different ethnic identity. The
asymmetry between the two parties may be vast, but the likelihood of their
forming a pre-electoral coalition may be high. This explanation is demonstrated
by using data from all authoritarian regimes and requires further testing, using just
data from competitive authoritarian regimes.

Section 2.3: Hypothesis: Theory of Credibility
In competitive authoritarian regimes, the incumbent government
manipulates the electoral system to hinder opposition parties from gaining power.
Oppressive acts in the country’s history frighten strong candidates away from
joining opposition parties. Activists with programmatic aspirations not aligned
with the median voter are the ones who typically build the party (Greene, 2006).
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In these regimes, the mainstream media neglect the positive aspects of opposition
parties and are used for degradation. Basic freedoms in a democracy, such as
freedom of speech and assembly, may be controlled by the incumbent’s
bureaucratic system, hindering the ability of opposition parties to campaign. The
past legacies of incompetent opposition parties, often based on a leader’s selfinterest, reduce the political commitment of the electorate. Because of factors like
these, opposition parties find it difficult to gain credibility.
Credibility, as Alex Au states, “Is defined as that vague sense of
trustworthiness, competence, and professional qualification that has become a
touchstone of electability” (Waipang, 2010). There are four groupings of factors
that contribute to a party’s credibility. The first includes (1) its ability to attract
candidates. Since many professional individuals fear inciting the wrath of the
ruling regime, many qualified individuals do not join opposition parties.
The next cluster of factors regarding is associated with how unified, stable
and strong the party is and may be perceived: (2) the party’s ability to maintain
parliamentary candidates and leadership over multiple election cycles, (3) the
party’s discipline in projecting a single message, (4) the party’s professionalism
while campaigning for votes. This cluster of variables is salient because
opposition parties tend to come in and out of existence; they are unstable and
unable to maintain a unified party brand over multiple elections.
The next cluster of variables affects the electorate’s initial reaction to the
party: (5) the degree to which a party does not isolate the electorate by supporting
policies that repel the median voter, (6) the degree to which a party does not
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alienate the electorate by endorsing strategies that repel the median voter. The last
factor is fairly unique: (7) the degree of authenticity a party projects by
representing a non-ideological social cleavage, such as a religious or ethnic group.
If a party authentically brands itself as meeting the needs of a specific group, then
its credibility with that group is high, and its value to other parties’ increases.
In an opposition party system that is fragile and volatile, the “potential
cost” for a coalition with the wrong partner is extreme. If one party coalesces with
a party that is weaker, less stable or too different along ideological or strategic
grounds, then the electorate will decide not to vote for them. The variable party
asymmetry captures this cost, but the operationalization of the variable limits its
relevance to Singapore. This is because the power imbalance between the leading
party and the second leading party in the prior election is not showcased through
popular vote or seat share. Rather it is indicated by how credible both parties are.
Measuring the popular vote or seat share in a prior election often does not
showcase the power imbalances among opposition parties that deter coalition
building. Opposition parties are incentivized to coalesce when each partner
perceives the other as being able to provide unique value to the partnership. In
this situation, it is a “win-win” for all those involved. Certain background
explanations, such as economic performance, fail to explain this underlying
insight, as they neglect the exact dynamic between opposition parties and, rather,
emphasize a background condition that makes it harder for parties to beat the
regime. The variable age of the largest party, according to my interpretation,
exemplifies the importance of building a stable party brand. While this insight is
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important and meaningful in Singapore, this concept does not take into account
the stability of the second and/or third largest party.
In competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties tend to be fragile
and move in and out of existence. Thus, the largest opposition party is
conditioned to not trust the longevity or long-term effectiveness of a coalition.
This dynamic ensures that if all parties are weak, even if there is an insignificant
power imbalance, then opposition parties will still be less likely to coalesce. The
largest party will not assume that the other parties will become stronger in the
future and would rather compete directly than coalesce. This insight shares similar
qualities with the explanation of electoral prospects: if all parties are weak, then
there is a less likely chance of coalescing. However, the theory of electoral
prospects does not directly measure a power imbalance between the parties, which
is significant for identifying the “potential costs” of coalescing.
I hypothesize the following:

H1: The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases
when one potential partner perceives the other as possessing
less credibility with the electorate, and thus is unable to
provide unique value to the partnership.

H2: If the largest three leading opposition parties are weak
and do not possess a level of credibility in the eyes of the
electorate, then they are less likely to coalesce.
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The underlying insights of H1 are, first, that a leading opposition party can
lose credibility by coalescing with the wrong partner – a direct impediment to preelectoral coalition formation. Second, the leading party needs to significantly
benefit from a pre-electoral coalition. If not, it would prefer to compete alone to
avoid sharing the spoils of electoral success. The underlying assumption for H2 is
that because opposition parties tend to be fragile and volatile in competitive
authoritarian regimes, weaker opposition parties in these regimes will not trust the
longevity of the coalition. The parties will presume that they will be able to
compete against other opposition parties in the long run; however, there is no
concrete threshold for this measurement.
There is a lot of conceptual overlap between the notion of credibility and
the terms of existing theories. The Credibility Hypothesis will incorporate many
of the insights associated with the pre-existing theories to reveal the direct
impediment to coalition building in Singapore. Using credibility as an abstract
tool for viewing opposition party dynamics reveals factors that are correlative,
otherwise referred to as background conditions, and more important, factors that
are direct impediments or causative factors for impeding pre-electoral coalition
formation.
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Chapter 3: Opposition Party Behavior in Singapore
This chapter takes the case of the opposition party dynamics leading up to
the 2011 Singaporean general election to examine the applicability of the five
factors from the literature - electoral prospects, policy compatibility, external
pressure from civic society and/or the international community, the age of the
largest opposition party, and party asymmetry – on preventing the Worker’s
Party, the leading Singaporean opposition party, from forming a pre-electoral
coalition with other opposition parties. Involving a new competitive authoritarian
regime, the Singapore case study can be used to disentangle the electoral
dynamics that are representative of other competitive authoritarian regimes.
Singapore, as a post-modern state, also illuminates the unique electoral dynamics
challenging opposition parties in a modernized society. Essentially, this chapter
solves the puzzle of why opposition parties that compete in an exceedingly
skewed electoral arena do not work more closely together and form a preelectoral coalition.
The information and insights in this section were gleaned from scholarly
articles regarding Singapore and interviews with Singaporean opposition party
members and parliamentary candidates, civic activists, and academics, and from
fieldwork completed in late December 2013. The following Singaporeans were
interviewed: Yee Jenn Jong, WP parliamentary candidate (2011); Gerald Giam,
WP Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP)6; John Tan, Vice

6

An NCMP is a member of parliament who failed to directly win their electoral
ward, but was amount one of the best losers, by virtue of the margin they lost, and
provided a seat. They enjoy most of the voting rights of a regular MP, except they
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Chairman of the SDP; Goh Meng Seng, ex-parliamentary candidate WP (2006),
ex-parliamentary candidate (2011) and Undersecretary General of NSP; Syrafrin
Sarif, NSP member; Sylvester Sebastian, ex-RP member; Siew Kum Hong, exnominated member of Parliament (NMP7), civic activist, VP MAURAH8;
Roderick Chia, civic activist; Simian Samydorai, civic activist, President of the
Thinke Centre9; Terry Xu, Editor of Online Citizen; Bliver Singh, Political
Science Professor at the National University of Singapore; and a mole for the
government, a columnist of alternative blogs. For some of the arguments
presented in this section, a number line, derived from the interviewees,10 locating
each of the opposition parties’ positions on a 1-10 scale is presented. Since the
interviewees were opposition party members, civic activists and academics, their
opinions are not representative of the general population, but they are insightful
because they show how leaders perceive themselves.
The distinctions made in the analysis may be of less for explaining the
perspectives of the electorate. This is because many in the electorate are apolitical
and not aware of the differences among opposition parties. I surveyed 100

cannot vote on motions of no confidence and bills to amend the constitution.
NCMP’s are chosen by subtracting 9 from the number of parliamentary seats the
non-government party won (Singapore Constitution, Part IV -The Legislature).
7
An NMP is a member of parliament appointed by the President, usually a
member from civic society. He can debate and vote on all issues except
amendments to the constitution, motions of no confidence, and appropriations of
public funds and removal of the president. Nine NMP’s are appointed. (Singapore
Constitution, Part IV -The Legislature).
8
Human rights group that serves as Singapore’s ASEAN working group.
9
Conservative human rights organization.
10
Data compiled from answers from Terry Xu, Gerald Giam, Yee Jenn Jong,
Roderick Chia, Syafrin Sarif, Siew Kum Hong, Bliver Singh, Sylvestor Sebastian
and Jon Tan.
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Singaporeans at a mall in Singapore asking them about their civic engagement.
Because discussing politics is sensitive subject in Singapore, at the end of the
civic engagement questions,11 I asked which party they felt was most credible.
Fifty-two out of 100 people would not identify a specific party. Answers
included: “no idea,” “don’t follow politics” and “not much there.” Fifteen of these
52 people would not even answer the question and just walked away.
Nevertheless, 43 out of the other 48 people mentioned the WP. This illustrates
that the electorate may not know too many specific differences among the parties,
but that they perceive the WP as much more credible and different than the rest.
This is because of the WP’s ability to project a unified image and maintain the
same candidates for more than one election cycle.
Singapore is an ideal place for fieldwork, due to its small size as a citystate and the minute size of the opposition party system. To a degree, all the
opposition leaders, activists and academics either know each other or are
separated by very few degrees. I identified opposition party leaders using the
results from the 2011 Singaporean election. Since the Singaporean opposition
actively uses social media, I contacted most of my interviewees via Facebook. I
came across most of the non-opposition party members through reading
opposition blogs. I contacted around 50 people, and interviewed 11. Fortunately,
while in Singapore, I was able to engage with civic society organizations on
Human Rights Day. Since civic society in Singapore is underdeveloped, most of

11

The survey was conducted at HarborFront Mall in Telok Blangah on December
28-29. The mall is an upscale mall, and there are many tourists who use it, and
thus, I asked those I approached if they were Singaporean.
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the major organizations were represented at Human Rights Day. My exposure to
these organizations enabled me to understand the relationship between civic
society and opposition parties.
During my interviews, I typically asked the interviewees to locate the
position of all six opposition parties along a scale, operationalized by a 1-10
numbered line, on issues such as how mainstream the party is, to what degree it
implicates the PAP as immoral, and how much it prioritizes civil liberties. After
receiving those answers, I also asked the following questions: (1) What are your
aspirations for Singapore? (2) How do you view your party’s role in achieving
this goal? (3) What was your (if an opposition member) party’s goal in the 2011
election? (4) What is the relationship between civic society and the opposition
parties? (5) Are opposition parties more fragmented or unified? and (6) Why do
you think a coalition did not occur in the 2011 Singaporean election? Most
interviews lasted between one and two hours and took place in public
environments such as cafes, food courts and public parks.
The first part of this section provides a background history of Singapore
and the significance of the 2011 general election. The next section depicts the
internal dynamics of the opposition parties in Singapore, reveals how party
members view the opposition movement, and lastly, describes the interactions
among opposition party members leading up to and after the 2011 general
election.
The third section of this chapter assesses the salience of the five
aforementioned factors regarding the absence of a pre-electoral coalition in the
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2011 Singaporean general election. This was accomplished by evaluating the
explanations using the following questions: (1) Is the explanation valid with
Singapore’s electoral dynamics? (2) Is the explanation relevant to the realities of
Singaporean society? and (3) Does the explanation identify a direct impediment
to a pre-electoral coalition?

Section 3.1: History of Singapore
Over the last fifty years, Singapore has modernized from a developing preindustrialist society to one of the “Asian Tigers.” Since 1959, the PAP has ruled
the small city-state, preventing opposition parties from gaining power. After
Malaysia expelled Singapore in 1963, Lee Kuan Yew, the head of the PAP,
framed the event as a crisis and championed strong and decisive rule, by which
the PAP would be allowed to govern without political or popular opposition
(Gordon, 1998). Since that time, Singapore has been considered a hegemonic
regime, a state barren of political competition (Ortmann, 2011). Opposition
parties exist, but the ruling regime manipulates democratic conduits to oppress
any viable political opposition. However, for many, including Stephan Ortmann,
an academic based in Hong Kong, political dynamics drastically changed after the
2011 general election.
Due to the PAP’s winning only 60% of the popular vote, the lowest
percentage since 1960, Ortmann (2011) concluded that Singapore has reached
such a level of political contestation that the small-city state should be considered
as a new governmental regime type: a competitive authoritarian regime.
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Singaporeans such as Siew Kum Hong, a former Nominated Member of
Parliament, also viewed the 2011 election as a watershed event. Siew referred to
the size of the swing and the fact that an opposition party, the WP, won for the
first time a GRC (an electoral district in which four, five and six, parliament
candidates are slated together). This was a feat the public considered unfeasible
(K.H. Siew, personal communication, December, 17 2013). Nevertheless, even
with the opposition’s unprecedented success, the PAP still won 81 out of the 87
seats in Parliament (Ortmann 2011).
In Singapore, the PAP disregards freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, and freedom of the media. Leading up to the 2011 general election,
though, the ruling regime liberalized use of new media, permitting the opposition
parties to campaign and organize online. Online blogs hosted political debates
between opposing parties. Facebook groups were created protesting government
injustice. Internet news sites allowed the opposition to refute false allegations
spread by the ruling party. The first public debate since 1988 was allowed to be
aired, albeit the PAP was allowed two representatives versus the one
representative granted to each of the four invited opposition parties, and was
allotted the same amount of time to argue their case as the other four combined
(Ortmann, 2011).
While selective liberalization occurred, the PAP also clamped down in
different ways. During the election season, they took away the public’s privileges
to use Speaker’s Corner, an area of Hong Lim Park and the only place designated
for public speeches and events (Ortmann 2011). During the 2011 campaign
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season, after The Online Citizen, an alternative blog, hosted a political forum
featuring the leaders of every political party except the PAP, the government
forced it to register as a political association, which means the blog is required to
publish the names of key officers and reject foreign donations (Ortmann 2011). In
2013, Singapore’s media regulators imposed new licensing rules on 10 news sites,
including The Online Citizen (Wong, 2013). The new law forces each website to
pay a $50,000 deposit to the Media Development Agency, indirectly holding the
website hostage if the government wants to censor an article. The trade-off
between liberalizing authoritarian laws and tightening up control is a hallmark of
PAP’s recent administration. Figuratively, the PAP and the electorate share an
understanding: as long as the PAP does not get too authoritative, such as by use of
violent oppression, then most of the electorate appreciates the economic
modernization ushered in by the PAP and disregards the lack of freedoms.

Section 3.2: 2011 General Elections: Opposition Party Behavior
I. Opposition Party History and Results from the 2011 General Election
In the 2011 general elections, six opposition parties contested the PAP:
•

The Worker’s Party (WP), seen as the most credible opposition party
(Singapore general, 2011, 11), contested 23 seats and won 6 of them,
including a GRC (2011 parliamentary, 2014). Founded in 1957 during British
colonial rule, the WP maintains party discipline and possesses the most
organizational strength. Professor Singh of the National University of
Singapore views the WP as leagues ahead of other parties and the only one
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that has an organizational identity instead of a personality-based party (B.
Singh, personal communication, December 17, 2013). A poll in April 2011
showed that 57% of Singaporeans surveyed had a favorable view of the WP
(Singapore general, 2011, 11).
•

The Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) is the most vocal party in supporting
social justice and civil liberties. It has the historical baggage and legacy of
employing civil disobedience, as a result attracting the wrath of the PAP
(Waipang, 2010): Chiam See Tong, the undersecretary-general of SDP, was
unable to run in the 2011 general election because of a bankruptcy suit forced
by the PAP (Ortmann, 2011). Party official, Jon Tan, desires a full systematic
reform of government (J. Tan, personal communication, December, 17 2013).
In a survey leading up to the 2011 election, 25% of the population had a
favorable view of the SDP and 25% had an unfavorable view, the most
unfavorable percentage of any opposition party. The SDP contested 11 seats
and did not win a seat (Singapore general, 2011, 11).

•

The Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA) was weakened after the 2006
elections because the National Solidarity Party (NSP) and the Singapore
People’s (SPP) withdrew from the partnership (Waipang, 2010). Thus, the
alliance only consisted of the Singapore Malay National Organization
(PKMS) and the Singapore Justice Party (SJP). The SDA alliance was created
following the 1996 election. It was not a pre-electoral coalition because the
two parties that competed in the 1997 general election, the NSP and the SPP,
finished third and fourth. The PKMS is a party for the Malay voice; however,
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they are known not to advocate for Malay issues out of fear for the PAP’s ire.
Syafrin Sarif, an ex-PKMS member and current member of NSP, remarked
that all opposition parties recruit Malay candidates for GRCs from the PKMS
(S. Syafrin, personal communication, December 28, 2013). Goh Meng Seng,
ex-Undersecretary General to the NSP (2011) and ex-parliamentary candidate
for the WP (2006), mentioned that not many Malays are confident about the
PKMS (G. Meng Seng, personal communication, December 17, 2013).
Leading up to the 2011 election, this party became a non-player, competing
for only seven seats (2011 parliamentary, 2014). The rest of this thesis will
barely mention the SDA.
•

After leaving the SDA, the National Solidarity Party (NSP), under the new
leadership of Goh Meng Seng in 2007, went through a conscious rebranding
(James, Chia, Grant & Lee, 2011). The NSP has traditionally been a party that
attracts Chinese businessmen (K.H. Siew, personal communication, December
17, 2013). Realizing the importance of attracting strong minority candidates,
Goh created a Malay Bureau. Furthermore, in the 2011 election, the NSP ran
the most popular opposition candidate, Nicole Seah, a 24-year-old who was
able to connect with the younger generation (Ortmann, 2011). After the 2011
election, she publicly left the party for personal reasons. The NSP contested
the most seats of any opposition party in the 2011 election, twenty-four, but
did not win a seat (2011 parliamentary, 2014). After the 2011 election, many
NSP candidates left the party.
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•

The SPP was formed due to infighting between ex-Undersecretary General of
the SDP and the current Undersecretary General of the SPP, Chiam See Tong,
and the current SDP undersecretary, Chee Soon Juan (Waipang, 2010). A
former part of the SDA, the SPP is perceived as very personality-driven. In
the 2011 election, Chiam See Tong decided to run in a GRC and let his wife
compete in Potong Pasir, a district he had held for more than 16 years (R.
Chia, personal communication, December 26, 2013). The party is perceived as
a family party between Chiam and his wife Lina, which according to Siew,
limits them from being politically meaningful (K.H. Siew, personal
communication, December 17, 2013). The SPP contested seven seats and did
not win a single MP seat (2011 parliamentary, 2014).

•

Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam (JBJ), the first opposition candidate to be elected
to parliament in 1981 as the Secretary General of the WP, recently founded
the Reform Party in 2008 (Ortmann, 2011). JBJ has a legacy of accumulating
legal problems for strongly opposing the PAP. Three months after he died in
2008, the Reform Party was taken over by his son, Kenneth Jeyaretnam (KJ).
KJ squandered his father’s legacy and as a leader isolated other members of
the party (B. Singh, personal communication, December 17, 2013). In 2011,
the party contested for 11 seats and did not win one (2011 parliamentary,
2014). After the election, many members of the Reform Party, including
government scholars, left the party due to Kenneth’s inept leadership (S.
Sebastian, personal communication, December, 27 2013).
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This description of the opposition parties in Singapore showcases the overall
weakness of the parties: not one party competed in more than 30% of the electoral
wards (2011 parliamentary, 2014). Furthermore, it demonstrates the PAP’s
targeted activities to silence the opposition, as was the case of members of the
SDP and JBJ. Lastly, the collapse of the SDA after 2006 election and the RP after
2011 election, and the departures of Goh Meng Seng and Nicole Seah from the
NSP highlight the difficulty opposition parties have with membership and
candidate continuity from one election to the next.
II. Opposition Parties: Fragmentation and Coordination
Opposition parties in Singapore were unable to field enough viable
candidates to run in even 30% of electoral districts in the 2011 elections (2011
parliamentary, 2014). Before the election, after repeated calls by the SDP for a
common meeting, all the opposition parties gathered to discuss possible unified
strategies for the election (Ortmann, 2011). Because the parties lacked the
candidates to run in even a majority of the districts, tensions arose over which
party would run candidates in districts with a history of supporting the opposition
(J, Tan, personal communication, December 17, 2013). As in the 2006 general
election, opposition parties in the 2011 election met and coordinated which
electoral districts to contest. The aim was to avoid opposition parties’ competing
against each other, in order to make it harder for the PAP to win. Since only one
district ended up with a three-party race, this strategy was a win-win for all
opposition parties, with limited implications. For the first time in history, the
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opposition contested in every district but one, Tanjong Pagar, and in that district
the opposition party was disqualified for registering late (Ortmann, 2011).
In 2011, the coordination efforts were very challenging. John Tan, Vice
Chairman of SDP, stated, “The only reason [coordination effort] works is because
everyone seems to agree that if we have a three corner fight then PAP will benefit.
…That’s why this horse trading thing occurs even though it’s not a friendly
occasion” (Personal communication, December 27, 2013). In the future, as
opposition parties attract more candidates, the coordination meeting, according to
WP member Gerald Giam, might not be as clean (G. Giam, personal
communication, December 16, 2013).
While opposition parties in Singapore came together in the 2011 general
elections to coordinate districts, the parties were seen to be more fragmented than
united. Ex-Undersecretary General of NSP and WP parliamentary candidate Goh
Meng Sing commented:
[Opposition parties are] fragmented. Because well in Singapore political
parties are not driven by political ideologies. They are driven more by
personalities, self-interest and not even policy views. The only unification
idea is the PAP…They are not organized around a strong political
ideology or key issues that they need to fight for. …There are a lot of
historical baggage of rivalries among opposition parties. WP will never
work with SDP. For certain reasons. Conflict between the leaders will
affect direction of two parties.
Meng Seng also states, “I do not see a possibility for unity for opposition parties
at the moment” (Skype, December 19, 2013). For years, SDP has annually held an
event called Opposition Unity, but very few opposition leaders ever show up and
if one does, it has been in an unofficial capacity. According to SDP member Jon
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Tan, WP would not reply to the invitation (Jon Tan, personal communication,
December 17, 2013).
Nevertheless, opposition parties recognize the PAP as their common
enemy (B. Singh, personal communication, December 17, 2013). After WP won
the GRC, they were entrusted to manage the Aljunied-Hougang Town Council.12
Their responsibilities include the maintenance and conservation of common
property, particularly the areas of the public housing units referred to as the
HDB13 flats (Yee, Personal communication, December 18, 2013). In Singapore,
more than 85% of the population lives in HDB flats (Waipang, 2010). Over the
years, the PAP developed software to manage the process of collecting service
and conservancy charges (S&CC) and payments for services provided. A PAP
company was created to own the software. After the election, the company
licensed the software to PAP town councils, but not the Aljunied-Hougang Town
Council. WP had only two months to develop complicated and extremely
customized software to manage the town council (Ong, 2011). Even though the
opposition perceives itself as fragmented, if another opposition party won a GRC,
according to parliamentary candidate Yee Jenn Jong, the WP would lend it the
software. Yee says, “We are all fighting an unfair system” (J.J. Yee, personal
communication, December 19, 2011).
In the 2011 general election, there was no public announcement of a preelectoral coalition among opposition parties. However, in a 2013 by-election,

12

After the 2013 by-election, in which WP won a MP, the town council became
Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council
13
Housing Development Board
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caused by the resignation of a PAP member from Parliament’s, SDP invited WP
to discuss supporting the same parliamentary candidate (J. Tan, personal
communication, December 17, 2013). In a spirit of compromise and cooperation,
according to SDP’s public statement, the terms of the suggested deal were that
SDP would provide the candidate and, in the case of a win, WP would run the
Punggol East Town Council. WP did not even attend the meeting (J. Tan,
Personal communication, December 17, 2013). Giam, a parliamentary candidate
for WP, claimed that the SDP was accepting all the risks and no reward. Giam
also mentioned that WP would be seen as not having a policy position (G. Giam,
Personal communication, December 19, 2013). Conversely, Jon Tan of SDP said
that his party proposed the deal because “[they saw] that as a means to be able to
[unseat] the PAP. The way things are, none of the opposition has the muscle to
move the PAP. … So the only way is for us to unite” (J. Tan, Personal
communication, December 17, 2013). The WP won the by-election by more than
10% of the votes, surprising the PAP by the size of its victory (B. Singh, Personal
communication, December 17, 2013).

Section 3.3: Viability of Literature Theories with the Singapore Case
This section is analyzes the five factors in the literature: electoral
prospects, policy compatibility, external pressure from civic society and/or the
international community, the age of the largest opposition party, and party
asymmetry. The first section explores which explanations are valid, or true, of the
political dynamics of Singapore. This section examines whether the independent
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factors associated with a pre-electoral coalition are exhibited in Singapore. For
example, one explanation contends that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition
decreases when economic performance is strong. Validity is demonstrated if the
dependent clause, that the economic performance is strong, is manifested in
Singapore. The second section assesses whether the dependent clause is
realistically relevant to dynamics on the ground in Singapore. For instance, did
the economic performance of the country realistically affect pre-electoral
coalition formation? The third and last section seeks to demonstrate which factors
are a direct impediment to pre-electoral coalition formation.
The theoretical framework assumes that a pre-electoral coalition, at least
statistically, increases the chances of the leading opposition party, WP, and a
potential coalition partner to contend and pursue electoral success. This
assumption is buttressed by the notion that individual party supporters will vote
for the opposition party coalition, combining votes and increasing the strength of
the challenge. Coalition formations occurred in just 16% of authoritarian
legislative elections from 1946-2006 (Gandhi and Reuter, 2013, 140). Thus, it is
assumed that there is a direct impediment that creates a potential cost, inhibiting
two parties from coalescing.
Although it is productive for determining the direct impediment to preelectoral coalition, it is necessary to note that the framework has its shortcomings.
Inadvertently, it fails to expose the notion (outlined in the section on credibility)
that two weaker parties, which are not credible in the eyes of the electorate, are
more likely to reject a pre-electoral coalition. The threshold mentioned on page 20
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– that if not reached, will result in both the leading party’s and its potential
coalition partner’s not coalescing because they would rather directly compete in
the future – is not given its due credence. The fact that not one party fielded
candidates in more than 30% of the electoral wards indicates that the credibility
threshold may not have been reached. To deal with this problem, albeit
imperfectly, the analysis also uses the 2013 by-election in Punggol East as a
model. Since WP won the 2013 by-election, it can be assumed that they broke
through the threshold and that another factor contributed to the absence of preelectoral formation, especially since SDP publically proposed one.

There are nine explanations that require validity testing in this analysis. The
characteristics that need to be tested for their validity in Singapore are underlined
below:
Electoral Prospects:
• The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when electoral prospects
are low.14
• The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when economic
performance is strong.
• The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when a period of
liberalization did not occur.
Policy Compatibility:
• The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when the opposition
parties’ policies are similar to the regime’s policies.
•
The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when the opposition
parties’ policies are ideologically incompatible,15 that is, they are on opposite
sides of the incumbent on the most salient issues.1617

14

I separated electoral prospects from the operationalization of the variables
because there is clear evidence the prospect for electoral turnover is limited.
15
An example is if the incumbent has no policy position regarding abortion and
one opposition party is pro-choice and the other is anti-abortion.
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External Pressure from Civic Society and/or the International Community:
• The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases in the absence of external
pressure from civic society.
• The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases in the absence of external
pressure from the international community.
Age of the Largest Opposition Party
• The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when the largest opposition
party is newly established.
Party Asymmetry:
• The likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when there is asymmetry
between the largest and the other opposition parties, calculated as a ratio of
the popular vote and seat shares in relation to the other opposition parties in
the 2006 (previous) election.

I. Validity of the Explanations with the Dynamics of Singapore
Among the statements above, a statement is considered to be valid when the
underlined clause is true. Table 1 below summarizes the aforementioned theories.
Invalid
1. Absence of a period of
liberalization
2. Opposition parties’ policies
Ideologically Incompatible
3. Age of the largest opposition
Party
4. party Asymmetry

Valid
A. Strong economic performance
B. Low electoral prospects
C. Similar to incumbent policies
D. Absence of external pressure
from civil society
E. Absence of external pressure
from the international
community

1. Prior Period of Liberalization – Invalid

16

I added salience because if opposition parties are bi-polar on non-relevant
policies, then it is not a deterrent.
17
In Wahman’s theory they are linked. However, to analyze them more easily, I
separated them.

50
The theory posits that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases
when a period of liberalization did not occur. Since there was a prior period of
liberalization, this theory is invalid with Singapore’s electoral dynamics leading
up to the 2011 general election.

Since the 1990’s, a trend of limited liberalization in Singapore has been
somewhat constant. Ortmann writes,
In the 1990’s, the government decided to pursue a strategy of strategic
liberalization. Alarmed by the growing interest of voters in opposition
parties and aware of the growing complexities of society, the government
changed its approach and initiated a process that involved small, careful
steps of opening up that were often counter balanced with new more
control mechanisms (2011).
Indicative of this trend, as Ortmann contends, is the way apolitical
nongovernment groups are co-opted to work with the government and/or affect
policy making (Ortmann, 2012). This trend of limited liberalization manifested in
the 2011 election season. From 2011-2012, Freedom House changed its freedom
ratings from a 5 to a 4 because the campaign period featured more open media
and greater freedom of assembly than in previous years (Singapore 2012, 2013).
While the government-controlled traditional media still produced positive
coverage of the PAP, they also gave some positive coverage to the opposition
(Ortmann, 2012).
The growing role of the Internet had a dramatic impact on opposition
parties’ campaigns during the 2011 campaign season. The PAP allowed
alternative web portals, such as Online Citizen and Temasek Review to provide
unbiased news reports and critical opinions. The Internet provided a platform for
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opposition parties to combat false PAP allegations against their candidates. When
a government-linked tabloid smeared Chee Soon Juan, the Undersecretary
General of SDP, for planning a protest after a campaign rally, a Facebook page
calling for a boycott of the tabloid attracted eight thousand members (Ortmann,
2011). During the campaign season, the PAP alleged that SDP was pursuing a gay
agenda. To counter the claim, SDP then produced a video on their website and
other Internet links to refute the allegations. Furthermore, the human rights group
MARAUH launched a campaign just ahead of the election to remind voters that
the ballots were secret (Ortmann, 2011).18 The Internet also became a space for
uncensored debate as events folded on the ground and a space to organize, as well
as recruit volunteers, to support opposition parties, especially as polling agents
(Ortmann, 2011). Re-imposed limitations by the PAP to restrict use of Speaker’s
Corner, the area of Hong Lim Park designated for public speeches and events,
could not dampen the increased excitement and mobilization for the 2011 election
(Ortmann, 2011). Since Singapore liberalized, the notion that a pre-electoral
coalition is preceded by a period of liberalization is not applicable.
2. Opposition Parties’ Policies Ideologically Incompatible – Invalid
The theory posits that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when
the opposition parties’ policies are ideologically incompatible,19 that is, when they
are on opposite sides of the incumbent on the most salient issue. This theory is

18

The idea that ballots are not secret is still a prominent fear among
Singaporeans.
19
An example is if the incumbent has no policy position regarding abortion and
one opposition party is pro-choice and the other is anti-abortion.
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invalid with the Singapore case because opposition parties were ideologically
compatible on the most salient issue leading up to the 2011 general election.

In Singapore society, the most salient issue is the economy and not
democratization: poll data indicate that 70.1% of the population agree and
strongly agree that it is more important to have good economic growth than
freedom of speech (How, Siyoung, & Wieyu, 2011). The PAP’s facilitation of
modernization and economic growth forces opposition parties to not criticize
economic policies too harshly. All opposition parties are center left, in the sense
that they advocate a state with more safety nets.
More important, though, opposition parties in Singapore are not
ideologically distinctive. Their support, or lack thereof it, stems from their
credibility and not distinct policies. This is exemplified by the fact that 66% of
Singaporeans support the idea of having a stronger opposition in parliament
(Singapore General, 2011), yet less than 40% of the population voted for
opposition parties. The appeal is not a party’s specific policies, but that opposition
parties are alternatives to the PAP and support liberalization. In this sense, the
most salient issue for opposition parties is liberalization. Since the government is
repressive of democratic values, all parties are unipolar, on the same side of this
issue. The number line below, constructed by averaging the scores from
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interviewees,20 and showcases the unipolar nature of the opposition parties in
Singapore.
The Degree a Party Brands Itself as Prioritizing Civil Liberties,
Liberalization and Social Justice
1=Does Not Highly Prioritize – 10=Does Highly Prioritize
WP-6.1
NSP-6.6
SDA-4.6
SPP-6.2
RP-8.2
SDP-9.7

3. Age of Largest Opposition Party – Invalid
The theory posits that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when
the largest opposition party is newly established. This theory is invalid with the
Singapore case because WP is an older party.
In the 2006 election, WP garnered 16% of the popular vote and won one
seat in parliament, compared to the SDA (composed of NSP, PKMS, SPP and
SJP), which garnered 12% of the popular vote and one seat in parliament
(Waipang, 2010). However, WP’s success in the 2011 election, winning six seats
in parliament and a GRC, whereas other parties did not gain a seat, is also
indicative of the WP’s position as the leading party. According to Ghandi and
Reuter, in 25% of elections in which the opposition party has competed in seven
20

5/7 interviewees placed opposition parties on three different number lines
corresponding to the descriptions Civil Liberties, Liberalization, and Social
Justice. Their scores were averaged.
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or more elections, a pre-electoral coalition has been formed (2013). WP, a party
founded before Singapore’s independence in 1959, has competed in 13 elections,
and yet a pre-electoral coalition did not occur (Our History, n.d.)
4. Significant Party Asymmetry – Invalid
The theory posits that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases
when the largest opposition party’s strength is significantly asymmetrical,
calculated as a ratio of popular vote and seat shares in relation to the other
opposition parties in the 2006 (previous) election. This theory is invalid with the
Singapore case because opposition parties were not significantly asymmetrical.

The explanation that the more significant the party asymmetry, the less
likely a pre-electoral coalition will form is invalid with the Singapore case study.
WP, SDA were the only parties to win a seat in the 2006 parliamentary election.
As written above, WP garnered 16% of the popular vote, and SDA also won one
seat, but garnered 12% of the popular vote (2011 parliamentary, 2011). These
ratios are respectively 1.33 and 1. Since the ratio is low, party asymmetry, as
measured by Gandhi and Reuter, is not consistent with the Singapore 2011
elections. Other measurements of strength imbalances among opposition parties,
however, may be consistent with the Singaporean case. This will be further
explained in chapter 4, which outlines the case that credibility is the primary
reason for pre-electoral coalition formation.
A. Strong Economic Performance – Valid
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The theory posits that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases
when economic performance is strong. This theory is valid with the Singapore
case.

The relationship between high economic performance and pre-electoral
coalition formation is consistent in the 2011 Singaporean case. Singapore has a
highly developed market economy. It is the only Asian country with a solid tripleA credit rating. It’s GDP per capita as of 2011 is $56,521.731 (Ogg, 2011).
B. Low Electoral Prospects – Valid
The theory posits that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases
when electoral prospects are low. This theory is valid with the Singapore case.

Before the 2011 election, electoral prospects, according to the definition
that this means the likelihood of an opposition victory, were low, and thus the
explanation is valid with the Singapore case. In the previous 2006 parliamentary
election, the opposition won only 33% of the popular vote and two out of 84
parliamentary seats, and they did not win a GRC (2006 parliamentary, 2006).
Furthermore, one of the reasons Gerald Giam, WP parliamentary gave in response
to the question of whether the WP would likely combine with another party in the
future was that “unless [WP has a] clear shot taking over government, there is no
real reason to form a coalition” (G. Giam, personal communication, December 16,
2013).
C. Similar to Incumbent Policies – Valid
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The theory posits that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases when
the opposition parties’ policies are similar to the regime’s policies. This theory is
valid with the Singapore case.

In Singapore, the PAP government is a technocracy that has no extreme
ideological stances (Ortmann, 2012). The government implements policies to spur
economic growth and promote societal stability. Thus, the government has no
qualms about implementing policy changes introduced by opposition parties. For
example, the PAP adopted a smaller student-teacher ratio, decreased ministers’
pay, reduced the costs of public transportation through greater government
involvement, built HDB flats and lowered the prices to counter the rising housing
prices as per WP suggestions (J.J, Yee, personal communication, December 18,
2013).
In authoritarian regimes, opposition parties face a trade-off between voter
maximization and party building (Greene, 2006). Due to the limited prospects for
electoral success in authoritarian regimes and the risks involved in opposition
party involvement, opposition parties must programmatically appeal to activists to
recruit leaders and members. However, opposition parties, promoters of
liberalization, also must brand their party as being as close to the median voter
and incumbent as possible, to attract the largest number of voters (Greene, 2006).
In Singapore, the incentive for voter maximization compels opposition parties,
especially WP, to project party platforms similar to those of the ruling regime.
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In conversation, Goh Meng Seng, former undersecretary of NSP,
commented that when he joined NSP after the 2006 parliamentary election, he
intentionally rebranded the party to be close to the center, to appeal to the masses
and not to disillusion voters (Skype, December 18, 2013).21 The phenomenon of
moving closer to the PAP even occurred in SDP, with the most activist oriented
policies. According to party official Jon Tan, young party members in SDP were
concerned with promoting Dr.Wijeysingha, the first openly gay politician, to the
central committee (personal communication, December 17). Singaporean society
still discriminates against the LGBT community. For fear of disillusioning voters,
the younger members of SDP, the party that most actively prioritizes promoting
gay rights, were concerned with voter maximization (J. Tan, personal
communication).
The WP, the party most significant for analyzing pre-electoral coalition
formation, introduces policy changes, but projects a policy agenda very similar to
that of the PAP. After the 2006 election, WP rebranded itself to be alternatives,
but not direct opposition to the government (Ortmann, 2011). WP parliamentary
candidate Yee commented, “If there is some implosion in ruling party there is
some alternative that should be there” (J. J. Yee, Personal communication,
December 18, 2013).
D. Absence of External Pressure from Civil Society – Valid

21

The question of rebranding was brought up because of the article The
Rejuvenation of the NSP and the Rebranding of the SDP: Conversations with
Singapore’s opposition politicians
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The theory posits that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases in
the absence of external pressure from civic society. This theory is valid with the
Singapore case.

In Singapore, civic society does not pressure opposition parties to
coalesce, let alone often work together. Since Singapore’s founding, the PAP has
hindered the growth of an active civic society in the political arena. Stephen
Ortmann writes, “For a very long time, the government’s insistence on
technocratic policy making within a closed and extremely hierarchical system has
made it impossible for any advocate not directly linked to the political regime to
have any impact” (Ortmann, 2012, 4S). This is based on the PAP tenet that there
is one solution for all Singaporeans and that the state’s interest is not composed of
different competing interests (Tan, 2008). As opposition parties started gaining
limited success in the electoral arena in the 1980’s, the PAP liberalized measures
against non-government organizations (NGO’s) (Waipang, 2010).
Nevertheless, civil society in Singapore is extremely underdeveloped. In
December 2013, fieldwork for this thesis was conducted on Human Rights Day at
Speaker’s Corner at Hong Lim Park, the only location whose use does not require
organizations to register with the police, only online (Ortmann, 2011). From
informally conversing with those in attendance, it could be ascertained that there
were few formal civic organizations. Some policy advocacy, such as the antideath penalty campaign, was more informal and maintained an online presence. In
this country that does not protect freedom of speech or assembly, the crowd was
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extremely small, roughly 40 people. Roderick Chia, a civic activist from the
Human Rights Day event, listed only 15 organizations and informal campaigns
while describing civic society (R. Chia, personal communication, December 26,
2013).
In Singapore, civic society and political parties do not work together
publicly. Siew Kum Hong, Former Nominated Member of Parliament and Vice
President of MAURAH, a conservative human rights group, said, “If we work
with the opposition we may be branded as political and that has consequences”
(K.H. Siew, Personal communication, December 17, 2013). Roderick Chia, a
civic activist and independent researcher, commented that there was no direct
relationship between civic organizations and political parties: “Generally civic
society whether a political association or loose coalition are weary of Singapore’s
political parties. … Although many activists voted for the opposition and
volunteered during the 2011 general elections … activists tend to stay outside the
political arena” (Chia, Personal communication, December 26, 2013). Gerald
Giam, WP member, mentioned that there is room for collaboration and sharing
knowledge, but there is not a high degree of cooperation (G. Giam, Personal
communication, December 16, 2013). He asserted that demarcations between
opposition parties and civic society are important so groups do not lose their
objectivity. The two remain fairly separate. Some activists privately help the
opposition during the election season, like interviewee Roderick Chia, who
worked as a polling agent, and some opposition party members privately attend
NGO events – for example, the head of the WP youth party attended Human
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Rights Day (R. Chia, Personal communication, December 26, 2013)22 – but there
is no direct pressure from civil society on opposition parties.
The PAP incentivizes civic society to remain outside of the political arena.
The Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme, introduced by the PAP in
1990, is one of the PAP’s strategies to co-opt civic activists (Rodan. 2009) NMPs
apply and are appointed by the President to parliament and maintain the full
powers of a regular MP, except they cannot vote on money bills, bills to alter the
constitution, or motions of no confidence in the government. From 1989-2009,
appointees often were representatives of ethnic minorities or women, and of those
who championed welfare or environmentalism (Rodan, 2009).
All organizations are legally required to register with the Registry of
Societies (Chia, 2012). The Registry of Societies is a mechanism for evaluating
and controlling organizations in Singapore. The law provides democratic leeway
to legally dissolve an organization for undermining the national interests, or in
other words, politicizing an issue. There are informal campaigns such as the AntiDeath Penalty campaign and Save Bukit Brown, but the activists are wary of
joining the political realm. The former’s efforts in raising public awareness has
indirectly lowered the number of executions in Singapore from eight in 2004 to 0
in 2010, and the latter stopped the government from building an expressway on
top of a cemetery (Ortmann, 2012).

22

I met Roderick Chia at Human Rights Day at Speaker’s Corner. I recognized
his name from an article I read. Offhandedly, he pointed out the head of the WP
Youth wing.
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Some in the opposition have realized that enacting change is more feasible
outside of the political structure. Dr. Vincent Wijeysingha served as SDP’s
treasurer and stood as a parliamentary candidate in the 2011 general election.
Wijeysingha, the first openly gay candidate, decided to leave the political arena to
focus on civil liberties and promoting LGBT rights in Singapore. He felt that,
while his activist work aligned with SDP values, he would be able to accomplish
more as an activist instead of as a politician (J. Tan, personal communication,
December 17, 2013).Thus, the absence of civic society pressure is valid in the
Singapore case.
E. Absence of External Pressure from International Pressure – Valid
The theory posits that the likelihood of a pre-electoral coalition decreases in
the absence of external pressure from the international community. This theory is
valid with the Singapore case.

In 2011, there was no unified international campaign for opposition party
unity, or even democratization. The Singaporean model of authoritarian state
capitalism is extolled as a potential model for developing Asia (Henderson, 2012).
The international community neglects Singapore, according to Siew, because it
presents a different scale of human rights incidents without any emotive images:
Singaporeans live in a post-industrialist and safe state (Personal communication,
December 17, 2013).
II. Relevance of the Factors to Singapore’s Electoral Dynamics
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This section evaluates which factors are influential in pre-electoral
coalition formation. At the very least, a factor that is relevant must be considered
a background condition or, at best, a direct cause of the absence of pre-electoral
coalitions in the 2011 Singaporean election. By looking at the converse of each
possible explanation above, I identify the theories that are relevant. Below is a
summary of the factors considered relevant and those that are not.
Not Relevant
1. Low Electoral Prospects
2. Similar to Incumbent Policies

Relevant
A. Economic Performance
B. Absence of External Pressure
from Civil Society

3. Absence of External Pressure
from the International
Community

A. Low Electoral Prospects – Not Relevant
Analyzing the underlying opposition party dynamics in the 2013 byelection helps ascertain the relevance of low electoral prospects on pre-electoral
coalitions in Singapore. Leading up to the 2013 by-election of East Punggol, WP
had a high prospect for electoral success. This is evidenced by the fact that the
PAP was even surprised by the sheer margin the WP won by, more than 3,000
votes, which was a margin of more than 10%. As written in an earlier section,
SDP wanted to form a pre-electoral coalition with WP. According to SDP’s
public statement, “in a spirit of compromise and cooperation”, the terms of the
suggested deal were that SDP would provide the candidate, and if they won, the
WP would run the Punggol East Town Council (Waipang, 2013). WP did not
even attend the meeting (J. Tan, personal communication, December 17, 2013).
Giam, a parliamentary candidate of WP, mentioned that the SDP deal was
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accepting “all the risks and no reward” (G. Giam, personal communication,
December 16, 2013). There were alternative risks and impediments keeping WP
from coalescing with SDP. Because, in a situation in which WP had a high
electoral prospect, a pre-electoral coalition did not occur, it can be determined that
low electoral prospects during the 2011 election was not a relevant factor.
Similar to Incumbent Policies – Not Relevant
The factor similarity of opposition party’s policy to the PAP’s is not
relevant to, nor even a background condition for, deterring a pre-electoral
coalition in Singapore. WP gains it legitimacy by projecting policies similar to
those of the PAP. Seventy-three percent of the population believes that Singapore
is moving in the right direction because of the stability of the economy, social
harmony and peacefulness, and good management by the government (Singapore
general, 2011). The WP partially gains its strength and support by maintaining
policies similar to the regime’s policies. If opposition parties had policies distinct
from the government’s, the population would be less supportive in voting for
them, and there would be less of a chance a pre-electoral coalition would occur.
Singapore is a society that prioritizes stability. Extremely distinct policies would
oppose the value of stability (B. Singh, Personal communication, December 17,
2013).
B. Absence of External Pressure from the International Community – Not
Relevant
The absence of international pressure is also not relevant to the 2011
Singaporean Case. The PAP has brainwashed the Singaporean population to not
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be affected by the international community. Foreigners cannot donate money to
political parties, use the Speaker’s Corner or form partnerships with opposition
parties (Waipang, 2010). Furthermore, Singaporeans are upset by the influx of
foreign workers as permanent residents and temporary workers in Singapore (B.
Singh, Personal communication, December 17, 2013). This sentiment may
inoculate opposition parties from a susceptibility to international pressure.
Furthermore, because of Singapore’s global prominence as a model city-state, at
least to countries like China (Henderson, 2008), this explanation falls outside the
realm of reasonability.

A. Strong Economic Performance – Relevant
The strong economic performance of the PAP is a relevant explanation for
the absence of a pre-electoral coalition in the 2011 general election. In Singapore,
there is a link between PAP support and economic performance. A poll
conducted in July and August in 2010 by the Institute of Policy Studies at the Lee
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy found that 70.1% agree and strongly agree that
“it is more important to have good economic growth than freedom of speech”
(How, Siyoung & Wieyu, 2011).23 The population, especially the older
generation, prioritizes economic conditions over civil liberties. Since 73.2% of the
population agree and strongly agree that Singapore “should have a powerful
leader who can run the government as he thinks fit,” it can be postulated that a
majority of the population credits the divisive rule of the PAP for the economic

23

Only 61% of the younger generation, ages 21-39, agree with the statement.
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modernization (How, Siyoung & Wieyu, 2011, 12). Furthermore, 80.2% of those
who agree and strongly agree that “it is more important to have good economic
growth than freedom of speech” also agree and strongly agree that “Singapore
should have a powerful leader who can run the government as he thinks fit”
(How, Siyoung & Wieyu, 2011, 22). WP member Yee recognized this fact by
acknowledging that “because under PAP’s governance the economy improved,
most people don’t want to rock the boat” (J. J. Yee, personal communication,
December 18, 2013). Alex Au writes, “The deep de-politicization of Singaporeans
through the last forty years and the sustained government rhetoric about the
imperative of stability for economic progress have left many citizens extremely
wary of the politics of agitation” (Waipang, 2010, 118).

A strong economy is the foundation of continual popular support on the part of
the electorate for the PAP. In this regard, Singapore has mostly24 resisted the
theoretical undercurrents of modernization theory: that as a country progresses
through industrialization and becomes a post-industrialist society, values change,
as a country becomes more educated, wealthier and more individualized. In turn,
a country should liberalize and democratize (Inglehardt and Welzel, 2005).
B. Absence of Civil Society – Relevant
Lastly, the absence of civil society pressure is relevant to affecting the
formation of pre-electoral coalitions in Singapore. If civil society were vibrant,
24

Poll data indicate that the younger generations possesses stronger democratic
values than the older generations; however, the majority of the younger
generation still supports the PAP. Fifty-seven percent of those 21-29 perceive the
PAP’s renewal (re-generation) as a party progressing well.
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and if it politically pressured for coalition unification, it would have an impact on
pre-electoral coalition formation. Lack thereof is a background condition that
realistically hindered the WP from forming a pre-electoral coalition.
III. Direct Impediments to Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Singapore
To determine if either the economic performance of the PAP or the absence of
civic society pressure was a direct impediment to pre-electoral correlation, it must
be ascertained that an explanation reveals a potential cost for the WP if it
coalesced with another party. Below is a summary of the analysis.
Not Direct Impediment
1. Economic Performance
2. Absence of External Pressure
from Civil Society

Direct Impediment

The economic state of Singapore was not the primary reason that there
was a cost for WP to coalesce with other opposition parties. The regime uses its
wealth to gently buy votes. Professor Singh of National University of Singapore
commented, “If I am jobless …you don’t pay utility. You don’t pay school fees.
You don’t pay anything during the interim. This is the republic of Singapore …
and that’s the power of the PAP and it’s amazing” (B. Singh, personal
communication, December 17, 2013). Moreover, the PAP does not use its wealth
directly by paying off WP or other opposition parties, which would constitute a
disincentive for pre-electoral coalition formation. Consequently, the economic
situation does not impede WP from coalescing.
Similarly, while this theory is consistent with Singapore before the 2011
election, the absence of pressure from civic society is more of a background
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condition than a direct impediment. The lack of civic society pressure did not
hinder the WP from forming a pre-electoral coalition in the by-election. The lack
of civil society pressure would not produce a cost if WP coalesced. Even without
civic society pressure, the opposition felt compelled to meet. The determination to
coordinate was a win-win situation for the opposition. As a result, an impediment
that ensures that pre-electoral correlation is not a win-win situation must have
compelled the parties from coalescing further. Lastly, neither of the two WP
members interviewed mentioned civic society pressure directly or indirectly as the
primary explanation for the cold relations among opposition parties and for why
WP did not coalesce with SDP. More research is required to disentangle the
relationship between the dynamics of civil society and pre-electoral coalition
formation.
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Chapter 4: Credibility’s Impact on Pre-Electoral Coalitions
This chapter demonstrates that a lack of credibility among the five smaller
opposition parties in the 2011 Singaporean general election was the primary
impediment to pre-electoral correlation formation. Moreover, the chapter
illustrates how the theory of credibility relates to the explanations in the
literature. The first section demonstrates that the following two hypothesis are
evident in the Singapore case study: H1: the likelihood of a pre-electoral
coalition decreases when one potential partner perceives the other as possessing
less credibility with the electorate, and thus is unable to provide unique value to
the partnership. H2: If the largest three opposition parties are electorally weak in
the eyes of the electorate, then they are less likely to coalesce. The underlying
insight of H1 is that a leading opposition party may lose credibility by coalescing
with the wrong partner. The underlying insight in H2 is that, because opposition
parties tend to be fragile and volatile in competitive authoritarian regimes,
weaker opposition parties in these regimes will not trust the longevity of a
coalition and would rather compete in future elections. Thus, there is an abstract
“credibility threshold” that opposition parties in Singapore must meet to be
incentivized to coalesce, instead of to directly compete with other opposition
parties. The second section shows how the limitations of the explanations in the
literature, especially party asymmetry, are better demonstrated through the lens
of credibility. The third section discusses the role personal conflict and ego play
in Singapore and how these can be an impediment to coalition in competitive
authoritarian regimes.
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Section 4.1: The Case for Credibility in Singapore
Interviews with Singaporean opposition politicians, academics and
activists revealed that opposition party credibility was the predominant reason
why WP did not coalesce with other parties in the 2011 general election. In that
election, WP did not pursue coalitions because they perceived all other opposition
parties as less credible. When asked why the WP did not form a coalition, Gerald
Giam, WP parliamentary candidate, said, “There needs to be a coalition of equals
to coordinate” (personal communication, December 16, 2013). Singaporean
experts on opposition party behavior corroborated Giam’s assessment: Terry Xu,
editor of the Online Citizen, said, “Other parties are not strong enough for WP to
want to coalesce. Why would WP want to join if they can just beat them [in the
future]” (personal communication, December 15, 2013). Siew Kum Hong, Vice
President of the human rights group MAURAH, commented, “WP has succeeded
to a degree at maintaining party discipline showing external unity…WP is so
clearly ahead that they wouldn’t want to coalesce” (personal communication,
December 17, 2013). Voters would punish WP for coalescing with an inferior
party. Gerald Giam recognized this when answering why WP did not agree to
SDP’s conditions in the 2013 by-election: Giam said, “It would be accepting all
the risks and no rewards” (personal communication, December 16, 2013).
Professor Bliver Singh declared that if WP joined a coalition “it [would be] a
liability and not an asset” (Personal communication, December 17, 2013). Singh
also explained why WP did not coalesce, stating, “WP is the strongest party. As

70
long as we have personality-based parties, which are most parties in Singapore that will be the issue. They all are prima donnas while WP has finally out grown
that” (personal communication, December 17, 2013).
Answers provided by WP interviewees, Gerald Giam and Yee Jenn Jong,
illustrate the level of importance WP places on gaining credibility. Gerald Giam’s
aspiration for Singapore is “to develop a more credible and capable alternative
party” (personal communication, December 16, 2013). Yee’s suggestion for what
WP needs to do in the next election to move the popular vote for the opposition
from 40% to 60% is also revealing. He says, “WP needs to build … our branding
and slate of candidates” (personal communication, December 18, 2013). Neither
of the two WP members I interviewed mentioned outright that the other
opposition parties were less credible. Giam said, “I don’t like criticizing other
opposition parties,” and Yee declared, “I don’t look at them as competitors.” But
Yee also noted, “It’s clear [that we must] build up party brand. We are not ready
to take over right now. We need to offer [the electorate] a party brand can trust
[with] credible candidates” (J.J Yee, personal communication, December 18,
2013). The answer of Jon Tan, the central committee member of SDP, to why WP
did not want to coalesce with his party alludes to one of the implications of a WP
coalition with a weaker party. He says, “Because they fear getting near SDP. They
know big brother is not pleased with SDP and they know that they already
hammered SDP viciously, cruelly, and probably not spare anyone who comes
near us” (J. Tan, personal communication, December 17, 2013).
In Singapore, as in other competitive authoritarian regimes, credibility for
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opposition parties is at a premium. Electorally viable individuals fear joining a
party, and the incumbents manipulate democratic norms to hinder party building.
Before the 2011 election, WP was seen as the most credible party because they
maintained party discipline, actively campaigned in the non-election year by
engaging their electorate on weekly walks, and preserved viable candidates. Since
2006, WP has made a concerted effort to project external unity. Leading up to the
2006 election, Alex Au observed that speeches held at rallies by WP were
focused, and they elaborated on assigned parts of the party manifesto, points
covered also by candidates from SDA (Wapaing, 2010). WP members were not
allowed to interview with mainstream media to ensure their words would not be
twisted. The party was very strict about using social media to ensure that a unified
voice was publicized to the public (M.S. Goh, Skype, December 18, 2013). Goh
Meng Seng alluded to this, and objected the practice. This was one of the reason
he left WP for NSP after the 2006 election (Skype, December 18, 2013). He
believed the use of new media was necessary for training leaders in crisis
management. As Gerald Giam states in response to what is deemed necessary to
increase the popular vote from 40% to 60%, “It is important to keep up the
momentum. [We are] going against the trend by having a unified party for more
than two election cycles” (personal communication, December 16, 2013).
Furthermore, the institutional culture of WP consists of engaging in at least one
political engagement a weak. Candidates go on weekly walks to engage their
constituents. Walking the streets and talking to constituents face-to-face
circumvents the bureaucratic obstacles for campaigning. Ex-WP member and
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Undersecretary General of NSP, Goh Meng Seng commented on the habit of
weekly walks.
I have to give credit that they are quite consistent in that. Because Low
Thia Kiang (WP Leader) made it a point that every week there should be a
political engagement on the ground as a party organ … in an Asian
country you need to engage face to face on the ground. That’s how Asians
think and how the Asian mind works. If they see you on the ground they
will give you credit. (Skype, December 18, 2013)
WP built on its successes in 2006 by attracting even more viable
candidates (B. Singh, personal communication, December 17, 2013). Popularity
with the electorate and presenting viable candidates is a reinforcing cycle. The
greater the success garnered at the polls, the easier a party can recruit and
maintain candidates. Likewise, the more viable the candidates are, the more
support is garnered from the electorate. WP candidate Yee sent an email to the
two central committee members just two months before the election to join the
party and ask if he could contest in the ward he currently lives in and where he
was born. His significant public profile as an education entrepreneur, his starting
numerous companies leveraging Internet technology in education, made his
membership in WP and candidacy appealing (J. J. Yee, Personal communication,
December 18, 2013).
While WP has consistently projected party stability and discipline since
the 2001 elections, the other opposition parties are still perceived as lacking
organizational strength and cohesion. According to Siew Kum Hong, SPP, which
left the SDA coalition after 2006, is known “as Chum’s Party” which limits them
from being “politically meaningful” (personal communication, December 17,
2013). Roderick Chia says that the structure of the SPP, which competes in his
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district, “is family based. This was reflected when Chee brought a team to fight in
a GRC and let his wife compete in his old district that he won for 27 years. …
Bad strategic mistake.” Chia also mentioned that after the 2011 election,
members, including well-known government scholar Ben Pwee, “left because of
lack of human resources” (Personal communication, December 26, 2013).
According to activist Roderick Chia, NSP, the second party that left the
SDA alliance, had a rather “decentralized party structure” leading up to the 2011
election. He observed, “Each GRC team that was running was seen as doing their
own thing” (personal communication, December 26, 2013). As mentioned earlier,
NSP had the most popular candidate, Nicole Seah, who earned more Facebook
likes than even the prime minister. However, according to ex-WP parliamentary
member (2006) and ex-Undersecretary General for the 2011 election, Goh Meng
Seng, “We were one election behind [WP]” (Skype, December 18, 2013).
Because he is a key member of both parties, his analysis is salient. Goh Meng
Seng positioned NSP to be strong on non-divisive issues, such as housing
demand, while not directly criticizing the PAP, in order to rebrand the party
between WP and SDP (Skype, December 18). Nevertheless, after the 2011
election, Goh Meng Seng left the leadership of the party and moved to Hong
Kong (M.S. Goh, personal communication, December 17, 2013); Nicole Sea had
a public meltdown that hurt the party brand (Tan, 2011), and many members of
the Reform Party, who had joined NSP less than four months before the 2011
general election, subsequently left NSP (Former RP, 2011). Commenting on the
potential of NSP, Professor Bliver Singh said, “People look at NSP as a party that
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will go into parliament and make some noise … probably championing some of
my needs … people look at WP as a potential government” (personal
communication, December 17).
Unlike then the aforementioned parties, SDP lost credibility with the
median voter because their identity osculates between a human rights organization
and a political party. According to Jon Tan, a central committee member of SDP,
People in my party are very vocal, kind of like me. We are willing to take
risks. We are willing to bear consequences. So [PAP are] very afraid of us.
In fact we hear from some reporter who interviews us … if you look at the
newspaper from mainstream media, news about my party only trickles.
And some of these newspaper reporters confirmed with us under promise
of anonymity that my party is being identified as the party that [the
government] will be watching. The big brothers are watching. And they
should not write things that are overly positive (personal communication,
December 26, 2013).
SDP views the PAP regime very differently than the average
Singaporeans, which compels them to more actively and directly advocate for
civil liberties. Because of this, the PAP has targeted them: In the 2011 election,
their leader, Chiam See Tong, was unable to run due to a defamation lawsuit (Jay,
2014). According to Roderick Chia, “They are kind of unstable. Many personality
clashes. We don’t know if the candidates [voted for] will stay on for two terms…
Few of my friends volunteered [during the election season], but they all left.
[There are} very strong personality clashes [in the party]” (personal
communication, December 26, 2013).
Leading up to the 2011 election, the Reform Party went through many
changes that affected their credibility. Undersecretary General Kenneth
Jeyaretnam isolated key members in his party, leading to a mass exodus before
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the election (B. Singh, personal communication, December 17, 2013): at least
nine Reform Party members, including five from their central executive
committee, left (Former RP, 2011). At the time of the interview in December
2013, ex-party member Sylvester Sebastian believed that the party consisted of
less than 10 people, and he was unsure whether they had an active central
committee. He said, “Kenneth is his own party” (personal communication,
December 27, 2013). Leading up to the 2011 election, two out of the four parties
in the SDA alliance left. Professor Bliver Singh mentioned, “SDA is going to be
highly irrelevant in the time to come” (personal communication, December 17,
2013).
The instability of the other opposition parties ensured that WP would be
viewed as the most credible leading up to the 2011 election: 36% of Singaporeans
surveyed in April 2011 thought WP is credible, 7% more than any other party,
and only 24% thought that WP was not credible, 3% better than any other party.
Bliver Singh commented on the difference among the opposition parties but also
on the PAP: “We have got the PAP, which is premier league football. We got
division one, which is WP and all these guys, [the other opposition parties], are
division two and division three” (personal communication, December 17, 2013).
The evidence corroborates the hypothesis that WP did not pursue a pre-electoral
coalition because they were more credible in the eyes of the electorate. A
coalition with any other party would damage their credibility and not provide
significant additional value.
Interviews with WP members also corroborated the second hypothesis in
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the credibility theory: If the largest three opposition parties are weak and do not
possess a level of credibility in the eyes of the electorate, then they are less likely
to coalesce. WP knew that their chance to take over the PAP was not imminent.
WP candidate Yee overtly said, “We are not ready to take over right now”
(personal communication, December 18, 2013). Moreover, while commenting on
PAP’s future durability, Yee also said, “we are very practical people. Once [the
PAP] had mandate to run government and economy improved, most people don’t
want to rock the boat. [Because of] past economics people adverse to change”
(personal communication, December 18, 2013). Gerald Giam corroborated his
statement while answering the question as to the WP’s aim in the 2016 election.
He remarked, “In the long term be the ruling party. But we shouldn’t have too
lofty goals … it is wishful thinking” (personal communication, December 16,
2013). The weakness of the three parties is showcased by the fact that no party
had enough viable candidates to compete in more than 30% of the wards. Since
WP viewed themselves as weak, but more credible than others, they decided to
view the goal of taking over the government as a long-term ambition. Realizing
that other parties were also weak and they considered a coalition as less strategic
than competing alone.

Section 4.2: Credibility and Pre-Existing Theories
The theory of credibility integrates underlying insights that are represented
in the pre-existing literature, but are not illustrated through the operationalization
of the theories. The theory of party asymmetry is the most prominent example.
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Both the theories of credibility and party asymmetry measure a difference of
strength between opposition parties as the primary impediment to pre-electoral
coalition formation. However, party asymmetry’s operationalization by counting
parliamentary seats or popular votes, as in the case of the 2011 general election in
Singapore, may fail to reveal the imbalance.
Second, the theory of the age of the largest party also shares an insight
being tested. The age of the largest party reveals that the stability of one party
increases the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions. Opposition parties in
competitive authoritarian regimes tend to be fragile and go in and out of
existence. Thus, the age of a party may be an indicator of stability. Nevertheless,
unlike credibility, which encompasses both the leading opposition party and the
second and third largest in the operationalization of the theory, the age of the
largest party only involves the leading party. Ghandi and Reuter’s statistical
analysis demonstrating the significance of the age of the largest party in preelectoral coalition formation highlights the fact that when the leading opposition
party is young, the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition decreases, due to mistrust
in the longevity and benefits of coalescing with weaker parties. This insight is
similar to the theory that when all opposition parties are weak, or young, there is
less of a chance of a coalition forming, even if the difference in credibility
between parties is low.
The theory of electoral prospects inadvertently assumes a coalition will be
beneficial for improving the chance of success of the leading party. However,
viewing pre-electoral coalitions through the lens of credibility reveals that the
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electorate may punish a party with a high likelihood of electoral success when the
party coalesces with the wrong partner. Moreover, the credibility of both parties is
harmed when they advocate incompatible policies. The advantage of the
credibility theory is that it extends beyond just programmatic appeal to the
strategies employed. As the average score from interviewees shows, the WP
implicated the PAP in their campaign as immoral to a much lesser degree than the
SDP.
The Degree a Party’s Campaign Tone and Policy Positions are
Aggressive/Confrontational in Implicating the PAP as Immoral
1=Non-Aggressive and Non-Confrontational - 10=Aggressive and
Confrontational
WP-5
NSP-5.5
SDA-5.8
SPP-5.6
RP-7
SDP-8.6

The theory of credibility helps reveal how different strategies can affect
pre-electoral coalitions. In a country that values stability, SDP’s confrontational
nature costs them credibility. As indicated by the interview scores below, WP,
with a less confrontational strategy, is more mainstream than SDP. A coalition
among parties with extremely different strategies would punish the leading party
and make it seem less mainstream.
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The Degree the Populace perceives a Party as Mainstream:
1=Not Mainstream - 10=Mainstream
WP-9.6
NSP-7.1
SDA-5.5
SPP-7.2
RP-5.2
SDP-5.2

The notion that economic performance affects pre-electoral coalition
formation is also related to the notion of garnering credibility. In regimes like
Singapore, where the incumbent ushered in modernization, it is more difficult for
opposition parties to gain credibility and, as a result, form pre-electoral coalitions.
If all opposition parties are challenged at garnering credibility, then they will be
less likely to hit the threshold that would incentivize them to coalesce. Instead,
because opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes are fragile, they
will be more likely to directly compete, with the intention of beating the other
opposition parties in the long run. In a regime that experiences a prior period of
liberalization, opposition parties are able to more effectively campaign to gain
credibility. Lastly, the theories of external pressure by civic society and the
international community increase the costs to opposition parties for not
coalescing. All parties will lose credibility with the electorate if the opposition
parties are not susceptible to external pressure. Hence, credibility is a tool for
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understanding underlying insights in some theories and for explaining weaknesses
in others.

Section 4.3: Ego: Potential Counter Example?
Interviews with opposition leaders, civic activists and academics
acknowledged that personal conflict and ego play a role in opposition party
interactions. Five of the interviewees mentioned that opposition parties would not
coalesce because of personalities. Syafrin Sarif specifically said, “Everyone wants
to be the man” (personal communication, December 28 2013). In Singapore,
opposition party leaders often know each other on personal level. Personal
disputes may inhibit coalition building. SPP was founded because of a personal
conflict between Chee Soon Juan, current leader of SDP, and Chiam See Tong,
founding Secretary General of SDP and current Secretary General of SPP.
Moreover, Kenneth Jeyaretnam is universally disliked and degraded by opposition
leaders.
Because the electorate does not vote based on ideological positions,
candidates with public profiles are able to easily switch parties with limited
consequences. James Gomez, famed civil activist and ex-politician, stood for WP
in 2006 and ran for SDP in 2011 (James, Chia, Grant & Lee, 2011). One
argument maintains that the historical baggage from contentious interactions
among leaders and significant party flip-flopping are direct impediments to
coalition building. Furthermore, in Singapore, since the opposition party system is
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underdeveloped, those with ambition have the chance to lead and nurture a group
and, thus, opposition leaders often do not want to give up power.
While ego and personal conflict may be an explanation independent from
credibility, in select situations, it may also affect the credibility of a party. If the
public is aware that personal conflicts affect party behavior, they may punish the
party by viewing them as unprofessional and not possessing institutional
structure.
Nevertheless, while ego and historical baggage play a role in how
opposition parties relate to each other, they do not prevent leaders from working
together in clear win-win situations in Singapore. The electoral compacts in 2006
and 2011, in which opposition parties coordinated which districts to compete in,
to reduce the number of three-party fights, indicate that leaders can subvert their
egos for political gains. Furthermore, neither WP member mentioned ego as the
main reason for the absence of a pre-electoral coalition. While personal conflict
was not an impediment to coalition building in the 2011 election, it stands as a
possible counter to the theory of credibility.25 If personal conflict prevents the
judgment of a leader from recognizing win-win situations, then they will not be
able to ascertain when a coalition might be mutually beneficial.

25

This is especially true in cases when the public is not exposed to the personal
conflicts between leaders and parties.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This chapter aims to explore the ramifications of credibility for the academic
literature on competitive authoritarian regimes and discuss possible ways to
further test and explore the theory. The first section will argue for the applicability
of credibility to describing opposition party interactions in competitive
authoritarian regimes. The second section explores unexplored research areas.

Section 5.1: Credibility and Other Competitive Authoritarian Regimes
The notion that pre-electoral coalition formation is affected by how
credible opposition parties are with the electorate has significant value for
understanding party behavior in competitive authoritarian regimes. The dynamics
in Singapore and most competitive authoritarian regimes make it difficult for the
opposition to develop a credible party brand in the eyes of the electorate.
Incumbents in these regimes manipulate the democratic norms and make it
difficult for opposition parties to earn credibility. The risks associated with
starting or joining an opposition party ensure that civic activists are that the ones
who mostly build parties (Greene, 2006). These activists tend to want to brand
parties that do not appeal ideologically to the median voter. Furthermore,
opposition parties in these regimes tend to be a group of notables organized for
their own self-interest (Lust-Okar, 2006). These three common characteristics of
opposition party behavior in competitive authoritarian regimes create an
expectation that opposition parties are incompetent, volatile and fragile. Because
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of this dominant trend, each opposition party seeks to be viewed as credible with
the electorate.
Incumbents in Singapore and other competitive authoritarian regimes
manipulate democratic conduits to make it difficult for opposition parties to
attract and maintain viable candidates, publicize their message, and create a
unified party voice. Fear of reprisal for supporting opposition parties is a
dominant factor in many competitive authoritarian regimes. Monopoly of the
media, absence of freedom of speech and assembly, and manipulations of the law
are all tactics used to repress the opposition. Furthermore, incumbents co-opt and
divide the opposition to keep it from unifying. These conditions all inhibit party
building and make this theory of credibility significant.
Lastly, the theory of credibility assesses potential costs for coalescing with
the wrong partner. Since opposition parties tend to be weak and go in and out of
existence, there are greater consequences attached to pre-electoral coalitions. In
democracies, most of the time, opposition parties are consolidated and stable, and
candidates do not need to fear (that badly) the manipulation of electoral rules.
Successful coalitions in competitive authoritarian contexts have a higher reward
and a higher risk, due to the level of uncertainty regarding how much the ruling
regime will follow democratic norms and to the fragility of the opposition parties.
The former is monumental electoral turnover. The latter includes losing one’s
credibility by coalescing with a weak party or signaling to the regime that one is a
serious contender, prompting additional repressiveness. By viewing opposition
party interactions as a byproduct of the level of credibility each possesses, one is
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giving credence to the notion that coalitions in pre-electoral coalitions are
undertaken when there are mutual benefits for all those included.

Section 5.2: Further Research
To further test this theory, research needs to give attention to the theory of
party asymmetry. Party asymmetry has only been tested using a data set of
legislative authoritarian regimes. Due to Dunno’s work explaining the different
implications of coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes and hegemonic
authoritarian regimes, this theory needs to be tested with further counter examples
involving situations where leading parties coalesce with weaker parties, as
measured by popular vote or seat share, which can serve as case studies for
analyzing the applicability of credibility to other competitive authoritarian
regimes.
The hypothesis “if the largest three opposition parties in competitive
authoritarian regimes are weak and do not possess a level of credibility in the eyes
of the electorate, then they are less likely to coalesce” is easily testable. Using
data from only competitive authoritarian regimes, one can analyze the frequency
of pre-electoral coalitions in which the leading opposition party has garnered less
than 25% of the popular vote and more than 25% of the popular vote. A
researcher can selectively choose the credibility threshold, the minimum amount
of credibility one opposition party must have to be incentivized to coalesce rather
than merely compete with the opposition, to determine if this concept has a
bearing. Besides only using data from competitive authoritarian regimes, a
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research study can address the question: If the leading opposition party in a
democracy is weak (under 25% popular), is it more or less likely to coalesce,
compared to situations where leading opposition parties are weak in competitive
authoritarian regimes. The argument tests whether competitive authoritarian
regimes innately create an electoral threshold of credibility in which the leading
opposition party needs to be not too weak in order to be incentivized to coalesce.
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Appendix
The following Appendix consists of the interview transcripts and notes from the
fieldwork conducted in Singapore from December 15 – December 30. Professor
Bliver Singh and SDP Vice Chairman were the only interviews recorded and then
transcribed. Details notes were taken for the rest of the interviews.
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Roderick Chia
Civic Activist and Independent Researcher
Date of Interview: 12/26/2013
Please Breakdown Civil Society in Singapore, including the distinctions between
political association and non-active groups? (Political Association-*, Not Active#
• Human Rights
o Singapore for Democracy#
o Think Centre*
 Oldest Political Association
o Maurauh *-Siew Kum Hong Vice President of this organization
o TWC2-Transient Workers Count 2
 Alex Au is a key member of this party.
o Home (Migrant Workers)
o Workfair.sg
o Singapore Anti-Death Penalty
o AWARE –Woman’s rights
o We believe in second chances
 LGBT
o Sayoni.net-Queer Woman
o Coming Out Coming Home Coach Campaign
 I am an ally.
 Environmentalism
o NSS-Nature Society of Singapore
o WildSingapore-Animal Rights/Environmental
o Bukit Brown Highway campaign environmental/heritage
 This campaign was successful at modifying personality.
From a huge highway across ancestor’s graves to a smaller
project. Gave tours to any Singaporean
 Animal Rights
o Cat Welfare Society
What is the Relationship between civic organization and political parties?
 No direct relationship…generally civil society weather a political association
or loose coalition are weary of Singapore’s political parties. Although many
activists vote for the opposition and volunteered during 2011 general election.
I helped in Singapore 2006 election as a polling agent. Activists tend to stay
outside the political arena,
If all opposition parties would on the ballot in your district who would you vote
for?
 The opposition party with the most credible chance to come into government,
like WP.
What is WP’s organizational structure?
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Strong, structured…Impression I get is that they dare not speak during nonelection time. In speaking with public, they won’t say something too radicalgetting to the heart of the matter
They maintain very strong party discipline as a way to appeal to the
mainstream and swing voters, and to build up a certain credible team. They
have told activists that they can’t take on many of the issues.

What is SDP’s organizational structure?
 Many people have left after 2011 election
 Oscillates between human rights and political organization. In the past, it tried
to mobilize a civil disobedience movement. SDP looks at issues of civil,
political, liberties. Minimum wage. They are closest thing to a human rights
party. They are kind of unstable. Many personality clashes. We don’t know if
the candidate I vote for will stay on for 2 terms. Very individualistic. Few of
my friends volunteered, but they all left. Very strong personality clashes.
NSP
 Party structure is rather decentralized. Each GRC team that was running is
seen as doing their own thing. No coherent message. Reliance on personality
as the case of Nicole Seah. People have left.
SPP
 My district. Chee See Tong is a very solid character. Stood up to LKY about
GRC system.
 Structure is family base. This was reflected when Chee brought a team to fight
in GRC and let his wife compete in his old district that he won for 27 years.
Wife close to winning. Bad strategic mistake. They have open houses and
talks. And the occasional walk about. People left because of lack of human
resources.
RP
 Personality base
 Just Kenneth and Kenneth
Which parties are personality base?
RP, SDP are personality based. NSP is relatively personality base. SPP maintains
a family structure. The problem Singapore is that they are all somewhat
personality based. WP breaks the trend.
Why are parties personality driven?
Malaysia and Singapore developed differently. All parties are multi-racial,
according to PAP, we can’t take stability and harmony for granted. Even though
social policy is radicalized.
How does the history Opposition affect current party structure?
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History of Singapore dictates how opposition were destroyed in operation
Coldstone in 63’ and how they decapitated the opposition for a generation.
And also in 1987’ the Marxist theory-Operation spectrum, in which catholic
Singaporeans were campaigning for worker’s rights and they were arrested.
This increased the political costs for opposing.
Today there is no real ideological enemy any more. Closest thing is Islamic
terrorists, but they can’t link that with opposition. Unlikely there will be a
similar mass arrest. There would be a popular uproar.
WP quite impressive given the context.

What are the most Contentious issue that park awareness of the electorate towards
the opposition?
 Immigration vs. integration.
 Development linked infrastructure.
 Economic. If the country go into a downspin
 Civil liberties
Why wouldn’t the opposition parties coalesce?
 There are too many egos and what they perceived as self-interest.
 They wouldn’t unless it is very loose sense. We have seen SDA break apart.
No mew formal alliances. Just broad agreements to limit three party fights.
Why is there not future greater coordination among political parties and human
rights groups?
 Civil activists are too independent. Not Serbia and Montenegro. Human rights
activists have a hesitance with working with political parties. No political
parties can push the broad range of civil society groups. If have a chance to
win an elections they will have to make compromises with other parts of the
electorate, who are more focused on bread and butter issues.
Is Singapore a post-race society?
 We are very rationalized society. Disagreed that state is post racial. There is a
racial civic society. Welfare based on race. Each race pays a certain amount
for their own welfare fun. PAP has done a good job making race groups
apolitical.
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Gerald Giam
Non-Constituency Member of Parliament for Worker’s Party
Date of Interview: 12/16/2013
What are your aspirations for Singapore?
• To develop a more credible and capable alternative party.
• For a plural polity.
• On a philosophical level, a society more gracious and cares for society.
What compelled you to be involved in politics?
I studied overseas in a setting that had different views. When I returned, I got
involved in volunteer work, joined the civil service and foreign ministry.
Idealistically, I want to change the country for the better. I realized that change
needed to not be within the system, but induced. It would be more useful to join
opposition politics. The WP was up and coming and building a credible
opposition.
Why join WP?
WP was most established. I had the good fortune to meet WP members through
contacts. I was blogging at the time. They share my political leaning-left center.
There were not extreme and more progressive.
What is considered Right-Left in Singapore?
• Right: Authoritarian, Left: Freedom
• Right: Pro-business and wealth trickles down, Left removing barriers.
• No party in Singapore is pro-labor unions, but the left is concerned with
worker’s rights.
How do you react to criticism that WP does not take a position on major issues?
They are unfounded claims. We may not be as extreme.
What were WP Goals in the 2011 election?
After 2006 election, our goal was to capture a GRC and be presented as a credible
party people can trust.
Is there a screening process?
• There is not a not huge applicant pool.
• We couldn’t even field 87 wards
• There is an education criteria.
• More importantly though, candidates need political acumen.
What is your party’s aim for 2016?
• Capture another GRC
• More fronts as possible
• For the Long term, we want to be the Ruling Party.
• But we shouldn’t have too lofty goals. It is wishful thinking.
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Which opposition party is your biggest competitor?
• Not that much competition in our wards.
• Regarding party organization, until recently SDP has no clear succession
• We are quite ahead in the general population.
• Don’t like criticizing other opposition parties.
Why did WP not accept SDP’s proposal in Punggol East?
Accept all the risks and no reward. It was not well thought. We would be seen as
not having a position especially in light of PAP criticism.
Why was there a joint coordination effort among opposition parties?
We did it in 2006. A common interest is not fighting together so we can try to
avoid opposition party fights.
Is it likely opposition parties will coordinate again?
We need to find the people. It might not be as clean.
Is it likely WP will combine with another party?
• Unless there is a clear shot of taking over the government there is no reason to
form coalition.
• There are more seats to contest in than the number of candidates.
• Unless we really feel we can takeover government there is no incentive.
What is WP’s campaign strategy?
• We use online and social media. We need more volunteers and more
supporters now that there is a younger demographic.
• Ground out reach; face-face interaction.
• All parties survive on meager resources.
• Politics are low cost. We do not purchase TV advertisements. The last election
was less than $15,000.
Is sharing resources a possibility for Opposition parties?
• There is not much thought to coordinate with other parties. More important to
be seen as a credible and consistent party. Maintain certain image then see as
huge party. No matter size want the party to reflect hopes and aspirations.
What is necessary for opposition parties to go from 40.1-50?
• WP won 46% of the vote in wards contested.
• Needs be seen as credible in the eyes of the voter.
• Singaporeans are very rational. They do not vote on single issues. They are
not attracted as charismatic personalities. Want to be seen as stable and not lot
loud.
• How PAP performing affects opposition party performance.
• Important to keep up momentum. We are going against trend having a unified
party for more than two election cycles.
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Why did Gomez and Goh Meng Seng leave?
• They shared different policies.
What is the most Contentious Issue?
• Jobs. Anything that affects the pocket book.
What is the difference WP vs. PAP?
• WP advocates for a redistributive plan.
• WP wants to close up the income gap.
• WP supports greater social safety nets.
Why is the PAP so durable?
They focused a lot on economic issues. A whole generation is focused on
economic issues. Early decades they did a good job at building infrastructure.
People appreciate economic development. Up for grabs if economic issues remain
PAP’s source of dominance. Minority issues are now taking center stage. People
gradually want more plurality.
What policies would WP modify?
• Pushing certain issues to make PAP go more left.
• Push for a more universal healthcare coverage.
• A Less private model for transportation.
Has the PAP responded to some issues?
• Housing
• Transport
• Health care
What is you view on the relationship between civic society and opposition
parties?
• Room for collaboration.
• Sharing knowledge.
• Made speech on unemployment act and collaborated with migrant workers’
group to enhance policy debates.
• Not high degree cooperation.
• Need certain demarcation. Feel group lose objectivity if align with party.
• Civic society is politically neutral and there is no need for loyalty unless
interest aligned
• Most organizations are left leaning.
Is it hard to gain political resources?
• Not easy raise party resources for political reasons
Is the Opposition more fragmented than unified?
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Opposition is more fragmented than unified.
Is it Bad or Good?
• Bad for people who want to see PAP out of government, but good for voters
because gives them choices.
Why did a Coalition not occur?
• Need coalition of equals to coordinate.
• Focused building on our party.
• Agree a lot more philosophically than tactics
• Money is an issue, attracting credible electable candidates is.
Are you Optimistic?
• There has been some progress. It is a long uphill battle. There is no timeline to
take over government
• There is less fear of Lee Kuan Yew. Not as towering a figure. He is not in the
spotlight.
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Goh Meng Seng
Ex-Worker’s Party Parliamentary Candidate 2006, Ex-Undersecretary General
National Solidarity Party 2011
Date of Interview: 12/18/2013
“Not moving more to more liberal society”
“WP curbs growth on important voices on the Internet. Need time to grow and
groom politician. Not just about scholarship.
Why have opposition parties not been successful in the past?
Opposition parties primarily Chinese. When the electorate votes in the GRC they
think should I vote for the opposition’s weakest link or the minority minister.
Unfortunately, they look at the weakest link. Opposition parties do not groom or
grow minority leaders. That is the reason there has been no progress. Part of the
reason I left, when I was at WP I wanted to start Malay Bureau. Party leadership
is conservative. On the “A” candidate team, Malay candidate still weakest link.
All parties that grow racial balance will be more successful. WP did win because
Malay candidate weak in ’97. PAP can take care of all races; Malay and Indians
should not feel marginalized. They want more aggressive stand; WP can’t give
confidence and stability with all races.
•

WP not producing different views from PAP.

Who are the key opinion makers in society?
• Key opinion makers are Alex Ah, Alex Loh, The Online Citizen, Temasek
Review Temasek Review Helped Worker’s Party win. WP success comes
from new media
What do you see for Opposition Parties in the future?
• A lot more 3 corner fights
• WP not key party in long run”- “Not seeing any”
Can you describe the other opposition parties?
SDP: Strong belief in certain things. See world different than electorate. Dr. Chee
personally controversial because of behavior like the shouting incident. No foot
soldiers like WP.
Can you describe NSA?
NSP: Strong exceptional personalities. Party needs to be inclusive to be
successful. We attract young voters not older voters. Use to be part of SDA. Part
of precondition for me to join the party was to leave alliance. It was a marriage of
convenience. We should have started Indian Bureau. We were 1 election behind.
NSP positioned ourselves to be strong on a non-divisive issue, Housing, but not as
implicating. This would differentiate us from WP. NSP shares the decisionmaking process.
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Can you tell me about yourself?
• PR consultant starting your own company.
• In 2006, Worker’s Party leadership did not want to engage in new media on
political issues. More risks new media but as a politician need to learn to
manage crisis. Won’t have strong candidates if groom in the greenhouse.
Describe your time at Worker’s Party?
New candidates could not integrate with the old guard. Goh Meng Seng and other
candidates struggled with leadership.
•
•
•

Leader about managing resources and capital.
NSP don’t have a MP-No full time.
Running a party not a part time job.

Recorded Skype Interview:
B: There are a couple points I wanted go over more detail. Can you talk about the
underutilization or the role of racial communities or the non-Chinese oriented
communities in rallying them up or mobilizing them up for opposition parties?
Are the racial NGO’s for Malay or Indians underutilized?
I am not very sure what you are referring to by underutilized, but the situation in
Singapore is like this in the past in the beginning of the year 2000 there was a
SDA, Singapore Democratic Alliance, and this alliance form by four component
parties, One of them is a Malay base party called PKMS. Basically a Malay party
and historically a byproduct of Singapore’s merger with Malaysia like Amno
(Malay Party) with a branch in Singapore. So this branch was cut up from the
Malay Amno. But not many Malays have confidence in this party so the SDA was
a Chinese based party, like the PAP and NSP as well and one Indian party called
the Singapore Justice Party and PKMS and they come together and relay on each
other for candidates in GRC and this how they utilized this Indians and Malays
during elections but apparently that does not work out very well. Because the
quality of candidates provided by PKMS was not up to standard to even win or
get to close to 40% of the general votes in the GRC. So if you are talking about
the utilization of the Malays and Indians. I think in terms of the Malays the
opposition has a problem in grooming these candidates and traditionally for
Indians we have JBJ, who was an Indian himself and James Gomez, the Indians
are more politically conscious. They actually on the own accord join WP or SDP
to participate in general elections, but not Malays. Somehow the Malays are more
conservative politically. So that is why when I went over to NSP, first thing I had
to do was groom my Malay candidates. And that is how the Malay bureau came
out. And people ask me why did I not have an Indian Bureau because generally
speaking the Indians are more politically active, but in the ruling party and the
opposition parties. That is how I actually maneuver the structure of the NSP to the
structure of multiracial system instead of relying on PKMS for a Malay candidate.
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So I do hope with the win in Alljurnied GRC more qualified Malays professionals
will come forward.
How does the PAP hinder the opposition parties from gaining credibility and what
are strategies for the opposition parties to gain credibility with the electorate?
When JBJ started to win the seat the PAP used the factor of fear to prevent more
people from participating in Opposition politics. I would say JBJ was practically
crucified for his role in Anson. He was put in jail for something ridiculous. He
was not reinstated as MP in Singapore. And after 1989 with the use of ISA against
the Marxist bloc it backfired on the PAP so they changed their strategy and used
bankruptcy in the 90’s as a tool of deterrence to showcase fear to scare
professionals like Dr. Chee’s to whole the tie of these so called elites from
entering opposition politics. That’s what they are doing in the 80’s and 90’s. So
the Malays, which are more, contented with their lives and of course and the elites
of the Malay community would not want to join the Opposition. That is why the
Opposition parties we are very lacking in Malay good candidates. But after
20001, I think things took a big change of direction because WP started to work
up their system and branding and give confidence to the public. That’s a way of
gaining confidence and presenting a front that tells all aces especially the Malays
that it is okay to participate in opposition politics. It is not a matter of credibility
actually. It is a vicious cycle created by the PAP first to deter the talents of the
those who are well educated form coming into Opposition politics and for
ensuring no candidates join in the 80’s and 90’s. In fact, that did not actually
prevent people from voting Opposition. In 1991, we have four opposition parties
being elected as MP-3 from SDP and 1 from WP. The SDP side made a mistake
they mismanaged the town council and had part infighting and that is on their own
doing and undermine the political capital that they have gained in 1991 and up to
now they have not been able to gain that level of confidence from the voters.
Other parties are working quite hard to regroup and rebrand like WP and NSP and
we are quite successful for the moment. We are staging a bridge-gate for winning
the next election. However, the recent happenings in NSP and WP might actually
consume some of the confidence built up in the last election they are not doing
right well in managing their constituencies in the town council and WP MP’s are
not really performing up to expectations of the most high quality voters so I am
not very sure what would be like in the next election. Hopefully we can continue
the momentum built up in 2011. But I suspect that at most we are going to win
just to GRC’s in the next election instead of 1/3 of the seats.
How does a party regroup and rebrand?
There are two factors when a party regroups and rebrands. One is the human
resources. You have to try to recruit electable people, at least have a degree,
because in the Asian country like Singapore they are quite particular of having a
degree as a basic entry for a politician. Managing the human resources in terms of
having a core value. You go to us going with same mindset of doing groundworkTiming, weekly walkabouts, selling our newspaper, and knocking doors of course.
There are part of the human base of managing the human resource. To do
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rebranding one must also redesign the paper that we have and the website and the
content that we have. We actually have to beef up the contact that we have. These
are our party organs for our party outreach. Must of the efforts come from our
manifesto. Our manifesto has to be reviewed and our policies have to be reviewed
as well. We took about four years since I joined NSP to do all this. Of course the
job is not complete. But, more or less we were successful in bringing up the party
profile from relatively unknown party to a national level. I think that helps in the
last election. I was expecting the scholars Hazel to continue the work but
apparently she doesn’t have the time and quite disappointingly and all the past
hard work has been left, but I hope Janet will increase all these respects especially
recruitment and public engagement, in terms of press releases and policy stances.
So this is very important things to be done in order to rebrand the party to
somehow position the party in between the WP and SDP. The position initially
with the reset was somewhere in between SDP and WP. We are not as aggressive
in the human rights movement as SDP, but we do mention it and we took
initiative to bring up policy matters to bring in various forms and participate in the
national engagement for every budget and for every national day event. That is a
strategy I put over in NSP before I left. So, I hope the new leadership in NSP will
do that.
From your knowledge which parties do weekly walks?
WP. I have to give credit that they are quite consistent in that. Because Low Thia
Kiang made it a point that every week there should be a political engagement on
the ground as a party organ and that is actually very good. NSP use to do that
under my time, but after I left they don’t see it. But I think they will pick it up as
the election is coming. But SDP did not have a consistency of political
engagement on the ground. It depends on new media and new forms of policy
papers and all of that which is fine though but in an Asian country you need to
engage face to face on the ground. That’s how Asians think and how the Asian
mind works. If they see you on the ground they will give you credit. Although
you may have not done much on the ground they will say you have put an effort
in your political engagement. That is why SDP was not able to capitalize on the
voting stream in the last election due to these types of activities.
Are there any external pressures from international organizations to coordinate
campaigns, bolster the opposition as a whole, and support individual parties?
Well there is always been a rumor that SDP has help from NGO’s in Europe or
the US do their website designs and all of that but in Singapore perspective
especially for Singaporeans they are very concern with external international help
for political parties. And they formed a perception of distrust if a party is deemed
to be influenced by external government like US or Europe. SO I don’t think that
is a way move. Unless you are a NGO that is taking over a movement of
international human rights. People say that is fine because you’re a human rights
activist. But for a political party to engage in an international connection we have
to be very careful here because Singapore voters might see foreign influence in
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foreign politics. And PAP has rightfully capitalized on that accusing SDP of
foreign influence.
Is the PAP strong and unified or fragmented?
I have just receive info that something is not very right in PAP. It is quite
fragmented at this stage. Because when PAP starts losing votes anybody will
accuse anybody for losing that votes. Many people have different views on how to
gain trust of the voters. I mean all parties are factions even opposition parties no
matter how small they are. But for the ruling party like the PAP to have a fraction
that will be devastating not only for its own position but for the ruling position.
Historically Singaporeans do not like seeing parties having infighting. That
applies to SDP in the 1990s when they have an internal struggle and Chu See Juan
left the party the PAP took seats. So that is quite a clear single that voters like to
see a strong party. No matter its opposition party or ruling party to engage in
Singapore politics and not a fragment one. That’s why I have been very careful
when I leave a party to not portray an image that the part is fragmented. We just
leave quietly and amicably in good will instead of saying bad things about the
party just left. That is what happened to SDP and we have learned our lesson, but
PAP what have heard that the internal struggle us quite devastating at this stage.
Different camps have been ostracizing each other in the GE 2011. Different
camps have been ostracized by the main faction. We are actually anticipating a
breakaway fragment leaving the PAP and maybe joining a new party or join WP
or any other party to challenge the status quo. A smaller faction a marginal faction
to leave PAP to join WP and join any other party to challenge the main faction
controlled by the Lee family in the next election.
Are people telling you that from the PAP?
From all sources within PAP as well as on the grassroots. All are pointing to that
direction. We might see something happen next year. WE might see an
earthquake next year. I don’t think any MP’s from PAP will quit rather the second
liners. Those factions with future leaders who don’t see the prospect of being
promoted or minister MP in the next election to challenge status quo.
Is the difficulty for Opposition Parties to gain credibility once they win a district
or GRC?
Not really. Gaining confidence is not the problem, but to sustain it. To win a GRC
is not hard, but what happens if you win. If you can provide the necessary
management in the town council, play a good role in parliament as an opposition
member. The problem is sustaining. In 1991, SDP won 3 seats while the WP won
just 1. The problem is not winning but sustaining and from the historical fact of
what you seen if you won and failed to perform as expected you might lose over
the next two decades. So it might happen to the party but to the opposition
platform as a whole if the present WP MP’s they do not perform as expected. This
is our fear that we have. What happens to them affects us. In Singapore, people
are binary. It is either PAP or not PAP. They do not differentiate between the
Opposition parties. So WP will affect the perception of all other parties.
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Is the Opposition movement fragmented or unified?
It is fragmented. Because well in Singapore political parties are not driven by
political ideologies. They are driven more by personalities, self-interest and not
even policy views. The only unification idea is the PAP. But the question is if
PAP falls, what next. They will be fragmented. They are not organized around a
strong political ideology or key issues that they need to fight for. And that is the
problem Singaporeans face when they want a united opposition to fight the PAP,
which I do not think will work because if you are going to base on only PAP
sentiment. Opposition parties will not go far. Because there will be no clear
direction on how to manage the economy, the social workings of the nation. SO in
this movement I do not think it is possible for Opposition parties to be united in
that sense. There are a lot of historical bag gages of rivalries among opposition
parties. WP will never work with SDP. For certain reasons. Conflict between the
leaders will affect direction of two parties. But for NSP I think they have less
political baggage. They tried to be in the alliance with SDA. They are open to
work with other parties like WP and SDP. But what they lack is a strong political
ideology to conceptualize to bring a strong leadership for the movement. So I do
not see a possibility for a united from for opposition parties at the moment.
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The Mole
Opposition Blog Writer
Date of Interview: 12/18/2013
Once the interviewee told he was a mole I stopped writing in my notebook. As
soon as he left I wrote from memory.
Background:
• Financial Services
• Past President Financial Services Society
• Monthly column in mainstream media
• Alumnus of Raffles Institution
• American educated
Malaysia:
• Malayscankari has 3-4 million views a day.
Issues with the PAP:
• Biggest problem economic and social system.
• Government cash flow. They do not spend a cent on healthcare, housing and
pensions
• No transparency where money is going.
Pensions –
• Highest Contribution rate 36%
• Lowest pension (social security) interest rate when the government’s
investments arms have done well.
There are investment arms of the government:
• Sovereign wealth (Temasek) fund grew annually 16% over the last 39 years.
• GRC (Another investment arm) grew annually 6% over the last 10 years.
• Monetary Authority Singapore (MAS).
• For two of the investment funds the public knows where the money is getting
invested. In the GRC investment arm the public does not know.
Temasek Fund:
• No obligation or mandate
• No idea staff salaries
Singapore’s Transparency
• Must rankings based on government data
• Government rigs it
Mole:
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• “I am a mole… people send me files…whistleblowers send me files and say
look at this.”
• “How else can I analyze everything?”
• “1 year I was mentioned over 200 times in the media, radio station,
newspapers… They gave me a radio station and a column.
• I travel all around the world and give lectures lauding Singapore’s economic
development and social politics for the government.
• “I became a rich and famous.”
• “Government gave me side benefits.”
• “PAP’s incentivize to show how incompetent the opposition were. With me
that show that one person smarter than all the opposition parties.”
• Acquired government contacts through his relationship at raffles.
• Things will change when Lee Kwan Yew dies; ½ people in government upset,
but nervous. For many their children are government employees.
•
•
•
•

“I could never join the opposition. I would be dead.”
Opposition in shambles.
Thought I would be able to help Singaporeans
Many moles in society.

PAP has been Clamming down
• Breakfast club
• Blogger Alex AU held for contempt of court for his writings.
• Online Act
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Sinipan Samydorai
President Think Centre
Date of Interview: 12/15/2013
I met him at Human Right’s Day at Speaker’s Corner.
Think Centre is registered as a society and examines political development,
democracy, rule of law, human rights and civil society.
Partnership Civil Liberties
Samydorai comments that his organization promotes civil liberties in a nonpolitical way. While those who identify with parties are on their email list serve
and participate, Think Centre advocates and lobbies the government. The interests
of political parties align in varying degrees with the NGO, but the NGO would be
less effective if it partnered. Moreover, the NGO would not want their agenda
dictated by political parties.
View on Worker’s Party:
Understands why WP is not as aggressive promoting civil liberties and social
justice. Publically prioritizing civil liberties and social justice will threaten their
growing legitimacy. Samydorai believes they are doing similar things from
different angles.
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Syafrin Sarif
Member of National Solidarity Party, Malay Bureau
Date of Interview: 12/26/2013
What in life compelled you join alternative parties?
• The lack of Malay rights
“These parts of the world Malays are very mobile. Malay immigrants are all over
the world. Very heterogeneous. Look like India, Chinese Pilipino. Malay is not a
race but somehow history has pushed us together as one common entity called
Malay. Malay-Pan Asia is America of the east. Malay is one of the lost tribes of
Israel. Singapore is s protected. There are no volcanos, no national problems-its
paradise. People don’t die of starvation. Singapore and Malaysia are two different
political entities, but two centuries ago they were all the same. My entry into
politics was because as a teenager I always wondered about my identity in a
Chinese dominated country. As a teenager I tried to find who am I. Stereotypes of
Malay is stupid, lazy and inept. I don’t fit into a stereotype. Your own race
systematically sidelined and repressed. When I was younger I joined the SMNOnow PKMS (Malay arm) for 1 day. I decided to get out of it. I decided to join
Malay youth literacy association and was there 10 years. Moved up and up of the
organization. The government funded the organization. I was a good boy and
helped develop my skills and contacts. In 2004 when PAP announced ministers I
saw the 1 Malay thrown back to Environmental Minister-Rubbish. Regressed
from previous ministry. I met the president and deputy president of PKMS and
they asked for help. So I agreed. During 2006 election any Malay opposition
figure that dares advocate for Malay rights would be silenced. My strategy is that
I don’t want to get killed so oppose normal issues (Not Malay Issues). The PAP’s
strategy was to go after Indian James Gomez… I was in wilderness because I said
PKMS was infiltrated by PAP. Leaks from meetings-as with any other opposition
party. GMS met up with me in 2010 for 4 months I ignored him until he presented
to me that NSP wanted to start up a Malay bureau. Not about me getting a MP
seat but how can I be a tool to help my race. Its suicide for any party to play the
race card. PAP will come down hard on you. PAP have Malay Affairs Bureau so I
don’t see why any other party will need a Malay Bureau. Every other party used
PKMS party for Malay candidates. Some PKMS defected to WP. I was prepared
to get smeared.
In the NSP Malay Bureau there are six in the counsel. Three are Malays.
Aspiration for Singapore
“I want this place to be a wonderful place for people around the world to live
together. This is the place where multitudes will congregate. When we were 3.5
million people Malays were happy. We were taken care of. LKY was good in
early stages. PAP gone wayward. In 1979, public schools were for all 3 races.
Now there are specially assisted schools just for Chinese-elite-. This and for
everybody to share”.
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Please Describe NSP’s Organizational Strength:
We are strengthening the party. We are cleaning out and keeping scholars. Old RP
gone except Jeanette.
-Party is not just quite homogenous. You have factions: Old guards, young punk,
Malay Bureau, Reform Party. Jeanette is given the trust.
What does Goh Meng Seng leaving indicate?
NSP is an Organic party.
Is NSP a personality base opposition party?
NSP is not that personality base until Nicole Seah. Political party needs leader.
Any party that does not have strong personalities will die. Party brand needs
personality. GMS built brand and he was willing for others to develop that brand.
Doing non-electorate season is NSP active?
Never before has opposition party been active in non-elections. We went to
markets to appeal to electorate every Sunday morning. House visits. No
geographic location. Once per month there was an open house. There was also
periodic discussion on political reform with the public.
GRC’s and Wards contest in the next election?
4 GRC’s and 4 wards. Around the same as last election.
Why was there not an opposition bloc in 2011?
Personalities and egos. Everyone wants to be the man.
Necessary for Opposition coalesce to take over the government?
No coalition of convenience. Must maintain conviction.
Competitor?
Worker’s Party in a way.
More Fragmented or Unified
Why should we be united? In Malaysia they are all going to kill each other. I
don’t think it will work out. Hitler was part of an uncomfortable coalition.
What are your thoughts on the Hijab Issue?
At first I wanted to not get involved with this nonsense. But when Worker’s Party
published a non-statement I had to lobby. We published 4 drafts. We should give
Muslims freedom to where the scarf.
Is there a typical NSP parliament candidate?
Is there such a thing. One who is willing to engage PAP on policies? Not to
oppose for sake of opposing.
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Was there a vetting process leading up to the 2011 general election?
There wasn’t. There should be. WP is very strict and it is a strength.
What can opposition parties do to get from 40.1 to 50%?
How we address the fear. People scared. Still scared of human voting.
What is the most contentious issue?
Cost of living.
There are some PAP members feeling out NSP.
As Singaporean we gave up our comfort to make this country work. We didn’t
divide to become a national identity. Until recently with the influx of foreigners,
the social fabric disrupted.

113
Siew Kum Hong
Ex-Nominated Member of Parliament, Vice President of MAURAH
Date of Interview: 12/26/2013
What prompted you speak against PAP?
• Inequity I see in society.
• Compared to other NMP’s I was more open and more candid.
• Most NMPS come from establishment background. I didn’t come from that
background.
• I was a Public consciousness, writing commentary for the newspaper. 1 or 2
letters to the editor a week. When I write in Singapore press have to write in a
certain way.
• I wasn’t afraid to burn bridges.
• Spoke to Bramea Mathi and her advice was that her biggest regret was not
doing anything during the first term.
Can you describe the political climate?
• The party that values strong civil liberties is SDP.
• Don’t agree with their tactics.
• They don’t stand for anything ideologically.
• I seek to occupy middle ground.
Describe the 2011 Election Strategies
WP
• Position in the center and not PAP.
• Positioned middle ground-any policy proposed was very centrist.
• Failed comment on Minister’s strategies.
• Not meaningfully different.
• Appeal to most Singaporeans.
SDP:
• Leading up to 2011 election they moved closer to the center and was
presented as less threatening.
• Could have done better with less historical baggage.
• Centrist Candidates failed.
SPP
• Personality driven.
• Known as Chum’s party.
• Limited them from being politically meaningful.
RP
• Leadership problem.
• Kenneth was very active but squandered JBJ’s name.
• Not credible option seen as Anti-PAP vote.
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NSP
• Historically “Business owners.”
• Very ethnic Chinese. Rich Chinese businessman meaningfully fund parties.
• Moved away from Strong Ethnic Chinese.
• Brought Hazel Poa when Goh Meng Seng stepped down.
• Have many government scholars that are talented candidates.
• Nicole Seah’s very public meltdown harmed the party.
• She worked at digital advertising firm.
• First social media star.
• Speaks clearly
• Connect emotionally with voters.
• Very effectively deflect hard questions. Has EQ.
• Knows her limitations.
 Demonstrating maturity.
• Policy Base Campaign
Do you have a political future?
• Electoral politics requires more compromises that I want.
Please describe the funding capacity and organizational strength for each party?
NSP
• Great funding.
SDP
• Surprisingly good funding. Allegedly collect wealthy donations from
businessman. Party with best merchandise.
WP
• Great organization.
• Some % from elected allowance (MP earn 15,000 a month-PAP’s allowance
50% of payment)
• More MP’s in parliament.
• Lots of donations.
SPP
• Poorly organized-Chiams
• No institutional leadership
• Does not campaign too much
• Ben Pwee left, an ex-government scholar
RP
• Kenneth has a lot of money• Use to work at a hedge fund in London
What explains the durability PAP in the present climate?
• Control of the press
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• Good job improving people’s lives
• Opportunities existed for the opposition to gain supporters because PAP did
not get ahead of anticipating problems
• Unhappiness in transportation, housing-True bread and better issues
• Bread and butter is the core of political success
Was 2011 a watershed event?
• Size of the swing is meaningful
• Told everyone that PAP can lose a GRC
• Lost sitting Minister and possible Prime Minister
Why has the Opposition parties not coalesced?
• Personality” based besides WP and SDP.
• A lot of it is ego.
• WP has succeeded to a degree at maintaining party discipline showing
external unity. LTK is the clear leader. WP is so clearly ahead that they wouldn’t
want to coalesce.
• SDP, which is pretty disciplined and there is alignment in their views is
generally open for coalescing but no one wants to work with them
How can the opposition parties move from 40% - 50%?
• Need a lot of structural factors in favor. PAP has a significant supporter base.
PAP needs to fail at improving things.
What can the Opposition can do if opportunity arises?
• Improve candidates
• Sustain momentum
• Opposition parties are usually invisible between elections. Only SDP does
stuff. Hardly hear about much of the rest.
What is the town council jurisdiction?
• Provide basic services to HDB flats.
• Have no responsibility towards those who live in private houses.
• Must provide cleaning service and garbage services.
• There is a community fund, which is controlled by an advisor selected from
within PAP. Way in which PAP hurts Opposition parties
• HDP upgrading is at the precinct level each party has a voting agent at the
district to oversee the counting of the ballots. The order in which HDP flats are
upgraded seemed to be affected by if the district voted for the PAP.
WP is clear # 2.
What is the biggest wedge issue?
• General immigration.
• No articulation.

116
•

More than white collar.

What is your perspective of civil society and NGO’s working with opposition
parties?
• Careful working with parties.
• If work with Opposition. May be branded as political and that has
consequences.
• Opposition parties are keen publically collaborating.
Is greater collaboration important?
• Malaysia Civil Society worked very close together more aligned.
• Singapore not like that.
• NSP secretary general open to working with Civil Society.
• Difference in Malaysia there is clear opposition parties based on 3 groups.
Has SDP’s aggressive tactics not forced government to respond?
• Civil liberties don’t get much response.
• There has been no huge progress on bread and butter issues.
• Safety nets increasing.
Why does International Community neglect Singapore government situation?
• Different scale of human rights incidents.
• Tough galvanize in a meaningful way.
• No emotive images.
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Bliver Singh
Professor Political Science, National University of Singapore
Date of Interview: 12/17/2013
•

Teaching 35 years

Comments while Ranking:
In regards to the degree the WP is implicating the PAP as immoral:
• “WP… is much more decent”
Definition of social justice while commenting on WP -“Looking in terms of
poverty uplifttment, basic needs for citizens, income inequalities. Greater access
to all types of facilities for all types of citizens. Democracy and liberties may have
to be sacrificed [by WP] for justice.
• Even SDA and SPA and RP talk about unity in order to become electorally
effective, which is different than what each represent.
• “SDA is going to be highly irrelevant in the time to come. In the next
elections they will disappear. Chum (SPP) lost deposit in last by election”’
Commenting on NSP’s prioritization of Civil Liberties, Liberalization and Social
Justice:
• “This is the important party.”
• “NSP party of the young, seen as credible. People think they’re sincere.
People view them as honest brokers. They are going to get something in the next
election.”
What is the most important factor that the electorate needs to see in a party?
• “How bad is the other side? How bad is the PAP? How credible are the
opposition candidates.”
•
How do you measure credible
• Very subjective. You can say opposition team A. We are going to see a lot of
team A’s in the next election because the PAP is shaken and made a strategic
error not getting good people in. They are getting all the stupid scholars and guys
that are generals. They can’t connect with citizens. They are looking for
something new. The younger generation - They are not going to stand for that
type of stuff like my family did.
•
What do you see as the difference between the WP and NSP?
• “People look at NSP as a party that will go into parliament and make some
noise, probably championing some of my needs. People look at WP as a potential
government. If the PAP continue to bungle the next alternative we are looking at
is WP led alone or by coalition.
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Straight Interview:
Which parties have the organizational structure to be the government?
Only 1 WP. No one else
How do you see NSP’s organizational structure?
Coming up at the moment they are a personality base party. Few individuals are
able to connect. Nicole Seah moving backwards I think they lost one. She’s
retiring and has personal problems. This is the problem with opposition they are
personality base. WP use to be that but they transformed themselves as a mass
party. They have a lot of individuals, counting the number of individuals in the
party it is just amazing. You just met with Gerald Giam, honest, sincere. Have
you seen his book? People can say he’s just like me. I trust him. Even if you may
not know him. This is the younger generation which has it good. Singaporeans
have it too good, which is affecting their judgment. I think they are going to cry
very soon. I think the opposition doesn’t have it. They don’t have it yet. They are
very good at throwing stones at glass houses. The houses will crack and collapse.
The PAP is still the best party. I hope when the old man goes that they really
revamp themselves. I see them revamping. Is it fast enough is it good enough that
is one dimension. If they don’t change than they are in trouble because the people
will reject them, but not reject them like overthrow them now. Not yet. They are
going to lose big in the next election. They are going to still have total majority
and lose 20-30 seats.
Has the PAP responded to the needs people recently and how have they done
that?
Yes. First the social media. They have come to the stage where they realize like
two things. They have been in power over 50 years that the leader is important,
trying to show their golden leaders connected with the crowd. And they have
some very good leaders. I’ll give you an example. I teach a module on
government politics of Singapore. I organized a full day affair and two ministers
came. One was the education minister and one was the minister of law. And two
civil servants came. One member of parliament came. A month ago, the minister
of law and foreign affairs came and lectured the students. This is the new PAP. It
was never like that in the past. To get a bloody member of parliament it was like I
was talking to god. They are reaching out. There outreach is very, very good.
This place (NUS) is a barometer and I was surprised when I talked to my young
people. They were very, very positive
What about freedom and liberalization?
“It is very Western. It is not beating [important] here. There is a small category of
10, maximum 20 % who wish we had a bloody democracy. But for the majority
of the citizens this is not the issue. The issue is basic need, housing,
transportation. They are looking for the smaller man. Life has become very tough
for Singaporeans. Singapore has become very unaffordable. Life is tough for us. I
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have two kids. I spent ½ million dollars on his education abroad, but it’s an
investment.
Is there a pact between the PAP and the population in which the population does
not prioritize civil liberties as long as the PAP does not surprise them with
repressive acts and allows them to focus on basic needs? Is this a common
understanding?
This is one aspect of the psychological compact, but there is another thing. Over
the last 10/15 years, for ordinary Singaporeans right up to the middle class,
whatever they take back home we use to have a comfort zone. That has
disappeared. My son has been married for 3 years and he does not even have a
house yet. He’s camped out with me. Two issues are scarcity and affordability.
This is where the PAP has bungled and this is where WP has been able to pick on
them. All the private estate went for the opposition.
Would you ever be a candidate?
Partly because I am a scholar. I am able to talk the way I am. They are dying for
me. I speak seven languages. I’m serious public critic. I can stand up and shake
hands with the opposition and shake hands with the other side. I don’t want to
lose that goal in my life. The moment I join one or the other I lose it. You lose
something very precious in the country. I have achieved everything.
In terms of the six parties which ones are more personality base the ability to
actually campaign and becoming stronger?
All of them were weak and personality driven. In general, starting something in
2006, they found that the ground was sour. Parties were coming together, starting
to set up alliances. Something happened in Singapore by 2011. A lot of
youngsters actually were so sick and tired of the government. People no longer
fearful of anything. People were asking how much worse can things get. People
were having trouble economically, so we something shift. The single factor in this
shift was the sense that feeling betrayed by the government in regards to where
the foreigners are concerned. Not just white collar. We don’t see them, but when
they started to employ hoards of lower, middle lower, and middle level foreign
workers. They are in hawkers, our theaters, our busses, our taxies, our hospitals.
What the hell. Brought together everyone together.
Why did we see in 2006 and 2011 the opposition parties coordinating where they
are contesting seats?
Most of them are week. The strongest is the WP. People also felt that the WP is
the front of the train. Engine of the train starting to pull by the fact they brought
so many good people in the WP and not anywhere else. WP able to keep the
integrity of who we are and what we stand for everyone asking why don’t you
idiots get together. The notion comes together and it was just one guy Soon Chee,
which created a lot of credibility problems for him. Some people think he is sick
in the mind and some people think he is a spoiler for the government.
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Do you see in 2016 any opposition coalescing?
I see an electoral pact and we share where we are going to fight. The common
enemy is the PAP.
Party contested more wards?
I think the WP is going to contest in most seats because they have so many
candidates in the party. A lot many but they are not revealing it. They have the
numbers. They will have more than 100 seats contested. The electoral boundaries
will be expanded, big electoral boundary change, partly because the dynamics of
housing, Punggol will become its own GRC. 10,000 units are being built there, so
that’s 30-40 thousand people and the PAP is going to gerrymander. The WP is
going to focus on the both East. This is where they are dominant.
Why won’t the WP coalesce with the other parties?
The WP is the strongest party. It already coalesced with other parties and the last
labor party to join it was the last communist party of Singapore.
As long as we have personality base personalities which are most parties in
Singapore that will be the issue because they are all created on that basis. They
are all prim Donnas while the WP has finally outgrown that. If Chee Juan finally
loses his position and join the WP, but I see something else happening. The old
mode of political contestation in Singapore. It’s going to be an electoral pact of a
broad coalition of each maintaining their own identity, each agreeing on a
common enemy…and agree not to contest each other. That’s the furthest I see at
the moment.
Who do you see as WP biggest competition?
Nobody. Nobody has the same organizational strength.
Is resource sharing a non-incentive?
Part of the reason is sharing resources, but most importantly is why we want to
resource share. To achieve the big objective and not to kill each other at the other
guy.
What mechanisms government implemented to hurt and make it difficult for
opposition parties to attract candidates?
Since 2006 and especially in 2010 the cabinet has been very liberal in allowing
the opposition to use all sorts of things to and this is where the opposition has
made strides. The PAP controls the mainstream and nobody reads the mainstream
media. Everyone goes to the blogs. The liberalization advantaged the opposition
and disadvantaged the PAP. Same thing happening in Malaysia.
What happened in Malaysia?
Liberalization and nobody reads the mainstream media and everybody focuses on
what’s going on the opposition.
Can you turn back the clocks I know of the new blog policy?
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That’s the most they can tighten and I think they went more at all these sights
because they were becoming very effective. But to me, the most important in
regards to candidates, many are going to the PAP. The PAP is still getting the best
and the brightest. Party because of the network. Party in the way they get the
scholars the business connections. At the end of the day, look at parliamentary
power the opposition has only 7% .the moment you join the opposition if you are
the mainstream guy…other than looking for the private sector this place can hurt
you. The risks are still there. They are becoming less. My main concern is not the
opposition I am watching if the PAP is going to split within. The biggest
opposition is not the opposition but the PAP itself. Since 1955 when the PAP first
started its biggest opponent is its own shadow.
You saw what happened in the Presidential election. I am watching those things. I
give them respect, but I don’t think the PAP is going to be a failed party in which
these parties can displace them. I think it’s going to be something else, which is
much more significant until that significant moment takes place. You’ll see these
guys operating. They are not going to be able to crack unless something happens.
The PAP is very, very smart. They are a survivalist party. They can be bastards.
They can be godly. The old man is going to go the son is hanging on. The changes
that take place immediately after that the next election is the watershed election
because that’s the election there will be no Lee Kuan Yew it will be the last one
of Lee Hsein Yang. You won’t see Goh Chok Tong. The next election will
produce the next prime minister.
“The scenario I see 2016 there is an election and by 2018 he will resign and a new
prime minister will be selected…”
Is it safe to say WP is in a class of its own?
Definitely…
Has the WP strategy changed before the 2011 election and after?
In 2006, I could already see them operating, but there was a quantum leap in their
strategy. One was the tsunami of foreigners. Two, there was this awesome recruit
of great leaders. I think they recruited some people knock on the door and others
they recruit and many guys they join the party serve the ground. They don’t mind
helping because it’s a calling and over time after a while people are like why not?
This was the case for the case in Hougang. Do you see?
The new WP youth wing as important?
Hard to tell. SDP youth wing is interesting. NSP is quite active. The recruitment
level is a higher level than that. In the PAP the youth wing is not critical. The key
recruitment is the middle class and the older guys above who don’t qualify.
As long as they are able to get credible candidates, as long as they are able to
preserve this wonderful campaign strategy which no one has in Singapore. I don’t
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know what the strategy but they are a roller coaster on the ground. The only thing
which reminds me of that is what the communist use to do.
IS WP’s soft stance on controversial issues a strength?
Not true. Just on the Malay issue they did not have a strong position. The PAP
picked the issue on the Hijab and they said you decide on foreigners they have a
policy. They were the first on to come out with a paper countering the white
paper. How can you say they have no policies? I don’t buy whatever the PAP
says…
Is their softer alternative approach a strength?
If you understand Singapore’s political culture, they (WP) have benefited
materially from the PAP. Singaporeans have done well, beautiful country and safe
even with the riot. Very peaceful compared to India. Land problem too. Someone
takes my land and I have to defend it. What the heck. Here you don’t dare too
very legal very clear. Because of that Singaporeans do not like someone who says
let me overthrow the government. They want incremental change. That’s why
Chee Soon Juan is a madman so WP different. They call them soft to me it is very
sophisticated. They understand the psyche
Do you see the Opposition as unified or fragmented?
Very fragmented. The key difference is Chee and others. Look they are all united
in bringing the PAP down, but beyond that there strategies the way they work.
You shouldn’t be comparing apples to oranges. Why? Here you got a mass party
like the WP. It’s a phenomenon in Singapore politics today. How many MP’s in
parliament, in the past the opposition guy not even smile and walk away. Today
you’ll see them say “how are you sir?” And we sit down and have a chat. There
was just a book out on operation Coldstone and Low Thia Khiang was there.
There were 500 cameras or more. Everyone is looking at everyone sitting there. I
had my son there and said, “How are you sir”? The guy in the back asked me if I
was standing as a WP candidate. I was like, “Oh my god. There has been a
change. I would not do that to the SDP guys. If I see Chee Soon Juan we don’t
even talk because we were colleagues here.
Is that a personal thing?
Not personal. He wanted me to destroy the PAP. I am an academic dammit. I am
a scholar. If something is good I say its good and if something is bad I say it’s
bad. Why should I destroy anything? Because it started like that. So I and he have
a very personal war going on, but the rest of them are wonderful
What do you view Opposition Party’s relationship with civic society?
Hard to say exact relationship because there are two levels for relationship. One is
formal. What you see in public. You see a lot of it, but the more significant one is
the personal level relationships and that’s what we don’t see and I think that is the
key. What is Braemor’s relationship with Chee Soon Juan?
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Do you see the civic activists pushing from a different direction?
I see them as pushing for bigger space which is the same as parties as of now the
parties are fighting for power which the civic groups are not I don’t know if we
are going to see what happened in Malaysia.
What happened in Malaysia?
I don’t know anything about what happened in Malaysia? Then you are in a very
difficult situation accessing what happened in Singapore. What happens there
occurs here. They started here this is our space our territory and started fighting
for issues for bigger space, like democracy, like corruption. Eventually many of
them joined the opposition because they were running blogs, very effective blogs.
People stopped reading the mainstream media and started going for social media.
All the social media chieftains are now today in the opposition.
Do you see Singapore opposition movements as an anomaly? Do they fit any
theory?
If it can happen in Malaysia it can happen here…if it can go on there it can go on
here…that’s why in the 2008 election when the governing party lost its 2/3
majority and 3 years later the government here got hit…the last election this year
in may…the Malaysia ruling party got 60% of the parliamentary vote but only got
46% of the popular vote…the public through their support to the opposition but
because of gerrymandering and the Malaysia system the ruling party remained in
power. I think you’re going to see the wards for the opposition increase, but how
much this increase translates into seats that’s another question.
Are there underlying factors that have pushed Malays to have more significant
blocs?
They are much more fearer. I mean Malaysia is a much more democratic party
than Singapore, always been, more space
Is their more political risk in Singapore?
I think they are opening up except lately over the last 6 months. They have tried
to tighten things up, but it’s not working. The moment you tighten the space here.
I go somewhere else and you can’t stop me. Some of the nastiest sites are not
based in Singapore. They are all over seas. So, how can you stop it? This is a way
you cannot win. As soon as you tighten it there is a backlash.
So Malaysia opened up earlier?
Absolutely. I think in regards to Malaysia they are way ahead of us. They started
so much earlier. They got their independence much earlier in the case of
Malaysia. They had a vibrant democracy all the while. In our case, we started
having some sense of democracy. Only in the 90’s.
Were there parties less personality base earlier?
Definitely. There parties are actually more communal base, race oriented. So, it
didn’t matter who was the leader. If it was a great leader it would increase a lot
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but the Malay for the Malay parties and the Chinese for the Chinese parties, so the
motes operando is different. But Singapore that came from Malaysia and had
most of our relatives there. It’s okay this can go on Malaysia and be okay. So why
not here? The argument is that it will destabilize us and lose power is crap and
zoom. So, people find it’s doable. There is a knockdown factor. How big remains
to be seen. But one for the reasons the government became so open after 2001
was partly because on the knock they got. But they got even more open now.
Was it gradual or was it pushed from some exogenous factor?
I think it was the bungling of the government and greater organization by the
opposition. In Malaysia, we have an opposition which one represents the Chinese
group, one which represents the Islamist group and one midway and they all form
pack. The unthinkable of the unthinkable occurred in Malaysia. A pack to fight
the government.
Why hasn’t that happened in Singapore?
If everything is equal, the chances of a pack are stronger here then there. There
they have a communal base structure here. We don’t have one. Ideology religious
base there. Despite the fact that they have differences there.
Is that because the parties are so different it is easy for them to come together
compared to hear where the parties are closer?
Partly nearer, but I think they realized that the only way to get rid of them was to
get to a pact. And stop fighting each other. They fought each other in some places,
but on the whole people thought it was time. It is also a coalition government…
Remarking on your quote that SDP’s proposal to partner up with a candidate in
the by election:
They were trying to talk let’s get together. It was all types of personal bargaining
and then they said go to hell with you. The WP told them to go to hell and then
the SDP came back and the WP says we don’t need you.
Why do you think the WP was not interested initially?
Because the WP is in a much stronger position. Because that place is WP
territory. This is where we were operating all the while. Who are you to tell me to
put this condition and you have no say here. So, we were working here for so long
and not surprisingly she won and it is not surprising that she won and did so well.
That constituency is surrounded by WP and you from outside who never ever
competed from there and offer.
Offline: “and this is why some believe Chee Soon Juan is a Mole.”
“Kiss of death for SDP”
B: The difficulty of attracting candidates.
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But it is changing for some parties. It is getting easier. I mean my colleague
downstairs just joined the WP. An academic. They are trying to get me. They
succeeded with him downstairs. He is already on the central executive committee.
He campaigned for the girl who won in Punggol and he won for her and there are
a couple more academics.
“The more you coalesce the more you share. The more bang for the buck.”
B: No reason to coalesce unless there is an equal.
Exactly. Exactly.
“We have got the PAP, which is premier league football. We got division 1,
which is WP and all these guys are division 2 and division 3. We are talking about
the coalition here and we are talking about the difficulties. I also see now a lot of
difficulties in all these parties in SDP Vincent just left. In NSP Nicole is probably
going to leave. In RP a mass resignation. SPP Chum SDA. They are all having
problems. I got the feeling that some of the young are going to join the WP if they
are credible. I would be the last man surprise if Nicole Seah joined the WP, She’s
just 26 year old and she is brilliant.”
Is she brilliant?
She’s brilliant. If she stands and Nicole Seah joins WP and WP contests in Marine
Parade, you bet my last dollar that GRC belongs to WP. This is the former Prime
Minister’s GRC. As long as she is not too ambitious. She did not want to be
Undersecretary General because of personal problems.
Do you see Goh Meng Seng coming back to politics?
Hard to tell? Does he have weight with the electorate? Not really. He has to be
part of a team and WP won’t take him. They don’t trust him.
Do you see Singapore as a very different model regarding democratization?
I very much think so. I think our model at the moment I don’t see a model. I don’t
see us fit any model that exists, part of the government is that we have a
government that is so rich.
So it’s not just the people it is the government?
This is one of the richest governments in the world, which uses its resources to
buy its way in a very gentle way.
Does that affect the opposition?
Why should I vote for opposition if I get whatever I want. I mean Singaporeans
are every pragmatic people. Don’t you forget we are all form immigrant beast.
We all came from somewhere, that dimension and because we are so small, the
sense of vulnerability remains very intense. And I think the government creates
this vulnerability look we are so overcrowded now. Was it deliberately done? I
think so.
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You think the PAP has deliberately created that issues, like overcrowded?
Everything. Overcrowded. Price of living because then they are in position to
solve it. So right now we have a cost of living problem. Okay, I’ll give you more
welfare. Wow hoorah. You got not houses. I’ll rush to my housing program in
two years’ time every Singaporean person who is eligible will get a house.
Militarily is really strong for the size and foreign relations is very important for a
government. How can they build credibility in dealing with that side of issues?
Difficult.
Is that something they think about?
Yes. Whenever we have a crisis with our neighbors, which is non-stop, the
opposition does not exist at all.
So what was the latest international issue?
The only time I heard the opposition doing something was when the Myanmar
leader get arrested and this guy was criticized in Singapore.
What issues affect Singapore?
South China Sea. The government is in such a strong position and credible
position. You hardly hear of foreign policy positions coming from the opposition.
It is coming in now. I think the WP now talks about non-alignment and this is one
of the problems. It is good to bring them in to make some noise, but not to run the
country, but they are not ready yet to run the country. Even the WP is not ready. I
think WP is going to increase their numbers, but it’s going to take its time. It
requires a bungling of the PAP. You come back to me 10 years from today we
will still be talking about things like this. The PAP are cautious people. After the
last election I think the population will get more conservative. What if the 40% of
the vote turned into 40% of the seats? I think there will be a push back, but WP
will do better. PAP are going to lose where WP is credible and the other parties
are going to be wiped out besides the NSP.
Why don’t you think NSP will be wiped out?
Because it is the next most credible party. People are like it’s okay. I dare to trust
my future with these guys because they are ok, but the rest well, I suppose the rest
is gut feeling. Again, Singaporeans are very conservative politically and
generally. When you see those in Clarke Quay and all that. That’s the yuppie for
the youngsters that’s not Singapore.
But is that where Singapore’s moving with increase wealth and increase
international exposure?
Somewhat. Somewhat. It’s a game changer 10 years down the road who knows,
but today not yet. They are not the majority of voters. The Clarke Quay
generation is here and when they are here fine and once they graduate and work
they are not what you think they are anymore. Things change. You see the pink
collar hair and that is the Singapore system with more and more Chinese and
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Indians imported into the culture. The conservatism more stronger than ever.
Indians become more in-looking. The Chinese more in looking. The Muslims
more in looking. There are more festivals today being celebrated than ever before.
Unbelievably. I never knew of so many Indian festivals and the government
promotes religiosity and spirituality.
What were the main obstacles in forming an opposition bloc and going forward?
First off there are very clear differences between the two parties. Personalities
will never jell. The number 3, WP says why should I join you? By joining you it’s
a liability and not an asset.
The most similar countries or more different in terms of how Opposition parties
behave?
It’s a question that’s difficult to answer. We only look at Malaysia. No other
country. We don’t look at Indonesia. We don’t look at Thailand. To me even
though Malaysia so different, they have a king and Muslim majority, Chinese
massive numbers, we still believe anything happen there can happen here. It’s
hard to find a comparison, partly because we never compare ourselves to anyone.
Is there one socio-economically?
We always look at Switzerland and Israel. These are the only two countries. We
look at Israel for defense. We look at Switzerland for economic development. We
never look at them for similar political similarities. That’s why I said it is so
difficult to answer. Countries for selective reasons not for general antics. That’s
why we always play this game that we are exceptional. The ideology of
exceptionalism drives us beyond meritocracy. That we are different and because
we are different we have to be super; but meritocracy is that you use a system that
best and the brightest going up. But today we are changing that notion. It’s not
just EQ and IQ. It’s everything, SQ Survival Quotient. Meritocracy today. At the
end of the day, what do you want to achieve? At the end of the day, we have to be
very different. We cannot be like them. The Israelis can still fall back. If they fall.
America will be there to pick their pieces. The Swiss can still fall back there will
be someone to pick the pieces. We have no one. This is what drives us and is very
deeply ingrained and strong and we all believe. All Singaporeans believe it.
That’s why we behave in a particular faction. The bloody Indians rioting what the
hell. We all collect and say no more. Hit them hard. When the Chinese bus drivers
went on strike. Hammer them bastards. That was the thing-wack them. That’s our
country and you’ll say hey democracy human rights right to protest but we will
say no you go back home to strike. Don’t come here and disturb our livelihood!
We have that. Maybe we have been too comfortable, but maybe things are still
relatively okay for all of us and at the moment if I am jobless tomorrow I can take
my identity card and go to my MP and go to them. I have a home. I have to pay
my utilities. I have to pay for my mother and four kids. I am jobless. “Can you
help?” “Okay. Go to the CDC, the council for development. Go there. I think he
deserves $1,500 for first three months and in the meantime get a bloody job.”
They hunt for you. You don’t pay utility. You don’t pay school fees. You don’t
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pay anything during the interim. This is the republic of Singapore and you don’t
know that but that’s the power of the PAP and it’s amazing. I don’t know how it
works.

129
Jon Tan
Vice Chairman of Singapore Democratic Party
Date of Interview: 12/17/2013
What are you aspirations from Singapore?
This age and time I would be pretty happy with Singapore becoming a true
democracy. The rest will have to fall in place. And people will have to find their
own way after that.
What’s your definition of a True Democracy?
Pretty much what we see in Europe and Scandinavian countries the form of
democracy that I respect the most. Even if we couldn’t reach that stage something
like the UK or US will be good too. Even though I see a lot more flaws there.
Checks and Balance is the most important thing.

What do you see as your Party’s role in achieving that?
We are working towards that. We are taking every little approach and taking any
little democratic space we might have. Albeit, it may be extremely small and little
here. To do our best to get a foothold into parliament and of course and we hope
to n replace the ruling party currently. It is only when we take over will we be
able to reform our system. I think in Singapore contrary to what a lot of people
think and see me and my party we believe that Singapore need a systematic
reform and not just changing a policy and tweaking. Kind of like writing an entire
bill of rights all over again and then making sure that there machineries will
ensure the longevity and enforcement of that constitution.
What type of systematic reform?
The entire system. Where do I start? Perhaps the constitution the bill of rights in
the American lingo. See the British do not have a constitution themselves but they
have a long tradition of going by certain conventions which is accepted and when
a party violates them there is real implicating. Like they can lose the next election.
And on a different level they have a fiercely independent judiciary. Again, the
judiciary government by lots of common laws and more and more are being
codified. Problem with that they have had colonized Singapore in the past and
before they gave us independence they wrote for us a constitution which is very
good and fairly democratic honoring freedom of the individual, rights to vote,
right to free speech, assembly right to association all the good stuff like US and
bill of rights. But problem is Singapore being taken over by LKY whose party
then wanted to be the sole party of Singapore so they put in place a lot of
oppressive and suppressive clauses controlling clauses into the constitution. For
example Article 14.1 in the constitution guarantees the right of every Singapore
citizen the right to freedom of expression, speech assembly, a fundamental right.
You can see in US bill of rights and UN declaration human rights. But here in
Singapore they inserted a second close notwithstanding the first clause parliament
will have the power to modify that when it comes to internal security. So now,
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with that they use that a lot. And they use that to suppress the Opposition-political
opposition. By putting political opposition in prison without a trial just in the
name of internal security. What type of threat are we to the country during the
days of communist trap. They will label opposition communist. With that label
they can run wild with that. So any organization that is labeled communist or
procommunist can be questioned without a trial. Let me ask you-who is the
longest serving political prisoner in the world. Well? Must people say Nelson
Mandela historically? Even Singaporeans give me the same answer. It’s a
Singaporean named Dr. Chia Thye Poh who served 32 years, five years more than
Mandela. Yet no one knows about that. And nobody cares about that. Because
people are playing there are very well. Ex-pats come here and say this is an
economically viable country and it is great. In psychology, we have something
called a hallowing affect. When someone is good at something you think that they
are good at many things and you can become a fan of that. If you see this country
doing well economically and you think everything’s well. But it’s not. America,
personally I think, they love Singapore because of two main reason I guess 2.
Because of Security in the region. Because America has been etched out of a lot
of traditional allies like the Philippines, with Japan is also making some noise
about the military bases and Singapore has welcomed Americans with open arms.
We have even built two piers to repair the American ships, not just commercial
ships but military ships. There are rumors that America has some of the missiles
built here. But that cannot be verified and no one can tell. Usually this
government is very quick to deny things. But if they are silence about it, you can
usually read between the lines.
In the 2011 election what was your party’s goal?
To get into parliament because without that there is not much one can do. And the
government of the day makes sure you can’t do anything and that you can’t get
into parliament.
How many wards were contested? We had 11 out of 89 or 87.
What do you think the affect would be if you are in parliament?
People in my party are very vocal. Kind of like me. We willing to take risks. We
are willing to bear consequences. So they’re very afraid of us. In fact we hear
form some reporter, who interviews us and stuff like that and reporter usually
active during elections time. If you look at the newspaper from mainstream media
news about my party only trickles. And some of these newspaper reporters
confided with us under promise of anonymity that my party is being identified as
the party that they will be watching. The big brothers are watching. And they
should not write things that are overly positive.
Commenting on Political Map:
“WP was not led by that before”
•

In jail many times

131
•
•
•

Speaker’s Corner exists because of my colleagues SDP
Party moved away from civil disobedience (90’s) shifting tactic because a lot
of parties are coming up.
Before no space for civil liberties,

Relationship SDP Civic Groups
• Prior to this wave of activism there were no lines. No other civic group in
2011.
• Now, TWI@-Trans worker Immigrant Works
• Pinkdot gay rights
• Transnational workers
• Friends said that civil disobedience not for SDP-we recognized that, but
couldn’t take the advice, now we can.
Is activism a feasible strategy get into politics?
No, Need take that risk
If not, no political space
Not same goal different strategy WP –SDP
• Under JBJ different when LTK kicked JBJ out WP timid
Low Thia Khiang happy co-driver
Wants to play second fiddle
Believes just need checks and balance.
SDP sees PAP as the source of lack of democracy, political freedom, civil liberty,
and Gini index.
Why did SDP coordinate with other parties?
If you been to one our meetings you would call it horse-trading and not
coordinating. Everyone wants this amount of space in these amount of
constituencies. So, there is a lot of trading and hard negotiating. The only reason
why it works because everyone seems to agree that if we have a 3 corner fight
then the PAP will benefit from that and we don’t want that to happen. That’s why
this horse trading thing occurs even though it’s not a friendly occasion works to
an extent.
Why didn’t you coalesce with other parties during the 2011 election?
We desired too actually. The SDP has initiated many times with all the parties in
the opposition for years. At least once a year we would have a forum and name it
Opposition unity, but nobody showed. Well usually one or two other parties
showed. PKMS-they are still around but they do not contest on their own. And
sometimes we would see people from NSP showing up and that is pretty much it.
And the NSP is very rare and it is not officially. People come on the unofficial
capacity. And for years we were doing that, but not body showed.
Why do you think no one showed?
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Because they fear getting near SDP. They know big a brother is not pleased with
SDP and they know that they already hammered SDP viciously cruelly and
probably not spare anyone who comes near us. And I think that is why people are
afraid.
Do you foresee it likely that the opposition parties would unite? Or SDP
coalescing with other parties?
We tried.
You say you and the worker’s party have very different goals are you surprised
they did not want to coalesce in the by election in 2013?
Not surprised. For a long time we have written to them to come to our forum and
they would not even reply us.
Why did SDP try to propose that deal?
We see that as a mean to be able to unseat the PAP. The way things are none of,
none of the Opposition, has the muscle to move the PAP in a way. So, the only
way is for us to unite. But a lot of them would say the same thing….But they
would not come to SDP’s meeting. They would not want a meeting initiated by
SDP.
Do you see the 2011 elections as a historical elections?
I think it’s a watershed. Not so much that we made inroads politically but to me I
think the greatest achievement is the shedding of some of the fears people have.
Fear is the reason people are not uniting. Sure, you can point the finger at other
factors, but fear is the greatest one.
Can you talk about your campaigning strategies in the wards you contested in and
how have they changed?
Over the last 5 years, it’s pretty much the same thing most political parties do we
go out on ground campaigns, talk to the residents, shake their hands, give out
pamphlets and pins, we give out a newspaper we produce and publish, and we sell
that for 2 bucks as a means for gaining funds and our website and now we have
YouTube and Facebook and those things.
Do you guys only campaign only in your district or do you campaign throughout
the country?
Both. When you have something on YouTube and our website you obviously
want everyone to see it. But when you go out physically you have to focus more
on the constituency that you are more likely to challenge and last election we 11
contests out of 87 seats so we focused.
Is it tough to attract candidates? Reason why there is only 11?
I told a reporter in one of my interviews. We have enough people who are capable
of taking over the entire cabinet at the drop of the hat. But, most of those people
are just so afraid to run as a candidate.
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So are they volunteers or are they just don’t want to run?
We have a mixed bag. Some are volunteers but just don’t want to run for
elections. Others are voter. And again, because of fear. I’ll tell you my story and
can tell you 20 other story but I’ll just say mine. When I was starting to run as a
candidate my mother in low came to me and she told her daughter and wife that
she must divorce him. My own mother in-law. My mother in law has been a
supporter and voter for the opposition. She hates the PAP. But aren’t you happy
now that I am running in opposition of the PAP. No Divorce him. Why? Because,
and she’s 90, she has lived long life and seen what the PAP has done to
Opposition candidates. People lost their jobs. People get bankrupt. People go to
jail. And up to today in 2011, one of our candidates submitted his name
everything was done and everything ready to go. He got his photographs and
publications at 12 o clock that night our party leader, my colleague said he got a
call from the guy. I’m out. My daughter is begging me and is working as a civil
servant, She’s afraid she’s going to lose her job. You know that this is very
unlikely. Yea, I know it’s unlikely. But in her mind she’s all stressed out and all
freaked out and she’s crying and I am thinking what do I do as a father. Pull out? I
can tell you twenty more stories like that.
There was one case a colleague of mine. We got sued by the government and we
were ready to fight our case in court. But, of course, they gave us a chance to
apologize publically and withdraw. And we said no we are going to fight it. But
some of us talked and that shows our position. Well, people have various reason
and someone told us their story that that night his own mother kneeled down to
him. And you know in the Chinese tradition and old person like a mom would
never lean down to a younger one. The younger one would kneel down to the
mom. So my own mom kneeled down so what you do.
LKY philosophy said is to slaughter the rooster and scale the monkey. So you pull
a person of the public square and hang them there and everyone be afraid.
Are people unsatisfied with the PAP?
You can break that up in a few categories. There are people who are fearful. In
Singapore one of the favorite phrases in the colloquial is “Can’t help it now”.
There is helplessness. Nothing you do will change anything-helplessness”.
Issue make people move their position and join a party?
Just anything really. Education you go to the US and learn about the Bill of Rights
when you’re in grade 5, there is nothing like that here in Singapore. A lot of
people here do not know their rights. When we fought for rights many of them
asked us so what’s the point of having human rights. Can it out rice in my bowl?
Can it put butter on my bread? What’s the point of having civil liberties? We are
so conditioned in this country to think only in economic terms.
Is that changing?
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That is changing, partly because of the lack of policy. Because a lot of the wealth
is stolen from the people. America is a poor country in fiscal form you guys are in
debt. But the average America is pretty wealth off. Here it is reverse. The average
Singaporean is pretty poor but Singapore as a nation is one of the richest in the
world. Because the government raided our funds and they do it in such a subtle
way that no one really knows. And if you dig into it it’s kind of crazy. The only
ones who know about these things when they speak about it they get in trouble.
Like my colleagues and I. So very few people speak about it. Many people who
are qualified, who have insider stories they won’t dare too. Of course there are a
few whistle blowers. Whistle blowers is not a good thing here in Singapore. It is
very dangerous. Now, what really change things now is the internet.
How so?
In the past when JBJ was torn apart literally in the center politically, financially
and hurt his reputation by the government especially LKY no one knows his side
of the story. You can write to the press and have a press conference whatever you
say you not going to see in the daylight newspaper. But when LKY whispers
something it gets all over the place. And sometimes does not have to whistle. And
he braggingly says and this is in public records. “I don’t have to tell the
newspaper or the court what to do, they know that to do”. See he is arrogant to a
fault, but we do and say it never gets into the press and sometimes it gets twisted.
I have told you that my party leader Dr. Chee Soon Juan, have you met him, he
got sued and got bankrupt for many years. Many suits against him. One of them in
a campaign he was going around in a pick-up truck with a loud speaker and
telling them to go out to vote for our party, which is totally legal in a
campaigning. Then he sees the PM at the time passing by even though he was far
away. So he used the loudspeaker and shouted Hey mister Goh where is our
Money. He became a bankrupt. Dictators have connections. At that time we did
not realize that Singapore gave Suharto 10 million dollars. Isn’t that the people’s
money. Shouldn’t he tell us about that? Even if it’s legit shouldn’t they know? So
he got sued innuendo because he was implying that the there is some wrongdoing
and that the money was given to Suharto. But Singapore’s government claims
there is not. So, Dr. Chee is stating a lie and he is instigating that the government
is involved in some kind of wrongdoing. So he was sued 600, 040 dollar.
How do you view NSP as a party?
Traditionally NSP does not exist between the elections. You never hear them
unless they run. You don’t know who they are until two months and 3 months
before elections. Suddenly they start campaigning. Suddenly they arrive in the
horse trading room and suddenly they want so many constituencies. Otherwise
you never see them. So you never really know their policies and whatever. And
just now you were asking me about policy and I want to let you know that it is
very hard for me to answer so many of the questions because SDP is the only
party that spells their policy. See people who join us know who we stand for. All
people who refuse to join us knows what we stand for. Perhaps they don’t agree,
perhaps they are afraid and similarly people who join us know what we stand for.
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The other parties have no real direction or value or principle to stand off they are
just opposing. And they gain a lot. And a lot of people vote for them not because
they like them but because they hate the PAP.
What does opposition parties winning 40% of the popular vote tell you?
40% hate the PAP. Including our voters. A lot of people vote SDP because they
hate PAP.
What do you think opposition parties to increase the 40%?
How do we capture the other 11%? That’s the difficult part. I can only speak for
ourselves. For what SDP is concerned we have taken a couple for steps like we
mention just now that we are moving away from civil disobedience and the more
traditionally belonging to the domain of NGO’s but that does not mean we don’t
care anymore or that we are not in touched with them. Many of our supporters are
in those NGO’s we touch base with them. We do not half as month of time to get
into those because now the space is beginning to open up and I like to think that is
because of our efforts. People are beginning to fill those gaps so we took a step
back. So that we can do what we should and ought to do. Then we didn’t see an
alternative. Now we have an alternative. We draw back and concentrate on
campaigning, on getting connected with the people, so we organize events to
attract events to learn about certain issues. We are the only party that produces
alternative policies to that of PAP. No other party does that. For instance
healthcare, we came out with Healthcare a very comprehensive program. And we
say look if you elect us we will put this program in place.
DO you view that because you lack so much fear compared to everyone else that
it is tougher for other Singaporeans to connect?
It is. But, then again if you don’t where do we get this space from? You put all
these efforts and now the people who benefit are the other opposition parties, the
NGO’s.
Is it tough to attract candidates?
Candidates are those who want to get into the parliament. I think a lot of people
see SDP as a harder party to get into cabinet because when people vote in
Singapore it is usually along party lines and not the person who runs and if you
analyze our results you will see that too. People vote for the party and not the
candidates.
Do younger people who join to SDP after going to Europe and seeing other
parties want a greater say in the exact policies?
They in fact have all the say they want. Just, some of the percentage of what goes
in our party does not seem democratic in their view. And sometimes they are very
unhappy with that. One example is that our constitution has separate members.
Two different layers. The person who started SDP Chum See Juan took a leaf
from the PAP constitution. They just pretty much coped the PAP and changed the
name from SDP to PAP. Don’t know why. For the PAP party LKY did it because
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the Vatican did it and eh was looking for a way to solidify power. Two types of
membership are the cadre and ordinary membership.
How do you become a cadre?
The existing leadership appoints a cadre and only the cadre have voting rights.
More than 4 people, but I don’t want to go into specific numbers. So looking at
the SEC that alone is 12 people so we have a whole layer of Cadre of ordinary
membership. So if they join us they get into ordinary membership first, and do not
have voting rights. And to a lot of European people they will say that this is night
democratic. Which I totally agree with. If we would change that right now, in my
personal opinion, we have so many things to focus on we are the midst of the
battle and we should not get distracted and the other reason the historic
environment politics is not what it is in the US with more competing parties to
govern the country according to their values here we are have the PAP will use
whatever tactics. If we would have a party with voting rights for everyone how
we can stop the PAP from coming in and influencing the vote. Like moles. We
have a core of people with similar values and are willing to pay the price so to
speak. To bring this country to a state of real democracy. LKY has done that
before.
When LKY passes will things change?
-I don’t think so. I don’t see the PAP as having so many brilliant people.
Alex Au-in contempt of court
Yawning Bread.
“I’ll never say passable if I see someone bullying another.”
“Evil man triumphs if good man do nothing.”
“Voting is secondary.”
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Terry Xu
Editor of Online Citizen
Date of Interview: 12/15/2013
“Other parties aren’t strong enough for WP to want to coalesce. Why would I
want to join if I can just beat them up…No such thing as sharing resources…It’s
not like Malaysia where they just want a fair election.”
“WP, SDP and PAP are the three parties with viable policies. The rest are just
proposing to be PAP Opposition. They are something different, but not that
different.”
“2011 election proved that there is more of an incentive to be an opposition party?
Public opinion supports you. An opposition party candidate said his private
business profits actually improved after he contested in the election. The greater
publicity will help if you do well”.
Notes:
Background on ToC:
Online citizen was started in 2006 by four brothers to be a platform for alternative
commentary. During the election, there were a greater number of staff members,
but the blog has shrunk because people had to get back to their professional lives.
There is a great risk at putting your name publically on this.
Media Laws:
Singapore’s new media licensing rules in 2013 forces websites with over 50,000
unique visitors a month and reports on Singapore on average at least once a week
over a two-month span to register with the Media Development Agency (MDA).
Once registered, a website needs to pay a $50,000 dollar deposit to the MDA. The
MDA can give you 24 hours to take down an article. Some consequences for
registering are that foreigners cannot fund the website.
Other blog websites
TR Emeritus-successfully supplied evidence implicating government officials in
scandals. For example WP Yao Lieng affair and Michael Palmer Affair
Real Singaporean-can be characterized as more of a tabloid.
Effect on TOC:
Before the 2011 campaign election the TOC was asked to register. Since they
have only taken down 10 articles. 9 times a private citizen informed the MDA that
the article was offensive. The last article the MDA asked. According the Xu, the
regime is scared for censoring a website like TOC too much because that will
arouse greater interest by the populace.
Party’s effectiveness on pressuring for reforms:
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No matter the party’s strategy and position, political parties have not been
successful at pressuring the government for reforms.
PAP’s engagement with Opposition Parties:
The PAP will discredit opposition parties and propagandize that they are not fit to
run the country, but then they will copy the policy platforms of the oppositions.
Economic policies of opposition parties:
Opposition parties discuss that money should be invested in local businesses
instead of providing tax incentives to bring multinational companies to the citystate. It is very difficult for local businesses to compete with multinational firms
and the government businesses. Opposition parties want the ruling regime to stop
being obsessed with GDP growth. The model of recruiting non-Singaporean
companies to increase the GDP is not good for the country.
The likelihood of an Opposition Bloc:
According to Terry, the WP is in a league of its own. They would not want to
unite with the other parties because they rather have the option of contesting them
in their regions. If the other parties get stronger then the WP will be incentivized
to coalesce.
Xu’s Characterization of the Worker’s Party:
Compared to other parties the WP is perceived by the populace as mainstream.
Thus, it is not proposing extreme changes. This is so that it does propose policies
too radical for the mainstream voter.
Optimism for the Future:
Xu is optimistic for the future. He quotes the change in the Punggol East 2013 by
election as an indicator that there is a growing support for the Opposition party.
He views the 2011 election as a “watershed election” because public opinion no
longer demonizes opposition parties.
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Yee Jenn Jong
Worker’s Party Parliamentary Candidate 2011
Date of Interview: 12/18/2013
What in your life made you want to be in opposition?
•
•
•

More competition needed in the scene.
Dominated by one party for so long.
If there is some implosion in ruling party there is some alternative that should
be there.

What are you aspirations for Singapore?
• Mature democracy.
• Political: Respect for all people for all type of affiliations.
• Economic: continue to progress, want be able to grow as fast. Need to be able
to grow at a manageable place.
What is Worker’s Party’s role?
• Alternative is very important. Take over government.
• Alternative policy ideas.
Yee joined politics 2011. Joined two months before election.
Why did you join WP?
Serious platform. Party view is what I believe in. Agree with most things they
say. If join policy just for opposing then they would need to split up. Best bet to
be alternative to government. Newest member in WP. Contested in this area.
Home ground since I was born. Speed cross check on one another. Quick
romance.
How did you reach out to them?
Just sent an email to top two members in candidates. Two weeks of evaluation. I
have quite a public profile running a business for 10 years. Company one of
largest players in education.
Who makes the decision?
From what I know of the party functioning there is a lot of consensus. The Central
executive committee makes decisions. If there are strong objections people have
to hold back.
What do you think about the Hiijab issue?
Societal acceptance. It’s about what liberty given plus what society should accept.
No problem accepting what the majority of Singaporean. We need a serious study
of attitudes. We ourselves would accept. In a multiracial society, don’t want to
push too much. So, we want certain balance. It should not affect the well-being of
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other races. Allowed in certain confines location. In uniform services. Teachers
are okay. If you are a nurse or policewoman. Outside work okay.
What were WP goal in 2011?
• Make in roads
• Invention of GRC
What do opposition parties need to do go from 40.1-50.1?
• What party and candidates stand for
• Party serious ideals and people electability.
-What is the goal leading up to 2016 election?
•
•
•

Level we can control
Building our branding and the slate of candidates
Build up pool credible people

How do you campaign?
We do not have any facility to do ground activities. We are not allowed to apply
for a venue. Reelected outright. Because we have control in certain spaces. We go
there it is very active. I am doing weekly walks. Sometimes twice a week.
Gerrymandering even more drastic. Only 9 days of elections. From the
nomination day to the polling 9 days. Time to walk the ground seriously none
days.
Restricted by elections committee, which is a function of ruling party. Strategy to
be heavy concentrated in the east. LTK sets a high standard. You don’t want to
disappoint.
Central committee 14 people they decide but they are voted on. Main party
stance. Must of funding on your own. Party group logistics and group expenses.
The biggest cost is rally size.
Is funding a challenge?
There is a limits: $3.50 X constituents.
What is the typical WP candidate?
Share party beliefs. If they have a different opinion party they are just borrowing
party brand. Stick with party long enough. The by-election is clear signal of what
type candidate we want. Young lady. Pretty ordinary. Executive-level
professional. We do have more qualified candidates. She worked the election
from ground up. Rewarded for working from the ground up. Met minimum
standard. The way they behave. Work experience. No matrix.
How is your experience with policy?
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-get on some govt. committees before. In policy groups mostly from the
professional level.
-As a businessman best way to make changes is as a business man. Changes are a
lot faster than 2011.
Which party is your biggest opposition competitor?
-Don’t look at them as a competitor. Clear build up party brand. Bit by bit build
up brand. We are not ready to take over right now. We need to offer them trust
and credible candidates. If they select us we would be happy to be the
government.
How many wards do you see WP competing in next election?
My Personal opinion is that we will not compete in more than ½ of the wards.
Certain things better to build it up so you can see a growth. Difficult to change
from 7 seats to 46 seats. People are adverse to sudden change. Next round more
serious challenge.
Candidates come and go in the past. They show in the election and then they don’t
stay. In the past it was extremely difficult to get candidates that are suitably
qualified. Many politicians bankrupt and there are political detainees. Sometimes
I have friends who are very qualified, but there is too much risk for their career.

Our competitor is not our fellow opposition. The target is the PAP. Enough room
for us to maneuver. Going forward more 3 party races.
Do you consider coalescing or absorbing other parties?
It is always better build up own capabilities before a dirty marry. In the past
things like that have happened. People jumping parties forming coalitions and
after that they disband. Because a lot in politics it’s about philosophy. If we win
then we are parliament and then we disagree we set the whole opposition back. If
need merge we would merge more orderly fashion with a more serious long-term
plan and then disband ourselves and then be taken as a fly by night as not a
serious party.
Is there a scenario where opposition coalesces as one bloc?
-Not right now. In Malaysia there the former PM kicked out ruling party and
coalesced other 3 ruling party.
Relationship civic organizations and WP?
Sometime in agreement. Sometime more opinion and then they can champion.
Generally, organizations best to do own research. Keep independent. WP against
mandatory death penalty certain things pushed in parliament that are also in civil
society. When there is an offer meet us we typically meet them. We don’t have
some serious coordination. But we feel generally that we have the parliament
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platform and that we should be using the parliament platform. They do their work
lobbying public and we lobby parliament.
What explains the PAP’s durability?
We are very practical people. Once they had mandate to run government and
economy improved, most people don’t want to rock the boat. Past economics
people adverse to change. By-election we do better than main election. Puggol
East we competed against four person election. By-election there no change in
government. Must people believe we should run constituency. On national level
don’t want to make that change.
Political landscape people are very afraid to contest ruling party. Many of this
imaginary fear. Hold record longest detainee in the world. Now he is out. These
are the legacies in the past.
What are the responsibilities for running a GRC?
That government flats are maintained and taken care of. Certain level of comfort
with MP. We go to many funerals. WP tend to be more on the ground.
Have opposition party been successful at modifying policy?
We don’t propose bills. We propose changes. Many ideas we proposed the
government adopted. For ex. The number of student teacher ratio was made
smaller. Ministers pay reduced. Public building more aggressive to make flats less
expensive. More last year than last 10 years. Public transport, greater government
involvement and intervention in public transport market. Can’t leave to private
market. Govt. popped investment. Give free busses company to run. Keep public
more affordable.
Every party needs to decide long-term viability. People come and go succession
in the past. Our rate in the last decade or so has been improving. People stick
around long enough. Getting about good candidates.
What is the most contentious issue?
Crowding out affect, the proportion of foreigners. Cost of living
More managed rate of flow foreigners. 20 years ago it was an 80/20. Now it is
60/40.
People like more transparency. Tend to be a lot of contentious about this. But the
civil service is a little guarded. Licensing websites. The whole process invents
new rules.
Opposition more fragmented or unified:
Too many parties. There is a natural attrition. When people see necessity they
merge. Rather not merge for the sake of another competitor. Eventually happen
because cost is high.
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Political view always various parties, people different political views some.
Make headway but saying PAP doesn’t know how to run town council. Ruling
party constituency came together and constructed company to create a system.
Created many millions over period of time. In 2010, before election it was sold to
a company called aims. So it was sold for 100,000 dollars. This company licenses
back the software and has the sole right to license it. Fortunately because we had
run one council we could upgrade it.
If another opposition party won another town council we would loan them the
software. We are all fighting an unfair system. The company could service it.
Totally unfair system. It is so customized that you cannot find.
Support level by people. Very race base. Party along racial lines.
Can’t be elite. We don’t have political pushy jobs. A lot of sons of ministers and
decedents of former MP’s have those. For us, it just we need to take the struggle
of the common people because there is a huge income disparity. There are people
who don’t blink an eye spending a lot of money in a night-club and then they are
people who are spending 800 dollars. Many people feel the ruling party has lost
touched with the common ground. Don’t feel public transportation problem. They
don’t take it. They don’t buy government flats.

